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I. INTRODUCTION
To say that technology is changing the world is a bit obvious. Commentators
incessantly herald a new age driven by technological advances and entrepreneurial
passion.' These changes are ever-present as can be seen by technology's
encroachment upon traditional methods of commerce.2 Auctions by wooden gable
are now competing with on-line versions, 3 contracts can now be binding with the
1. See Thomas A. Stewart & Jane Furth, The Information Age in Charts, FORTUNE, Apr. 4, 1994, at 75
(describing the transformation of industry as evidence of the new "information age"). But see Zachary P. Pascal,
Digital Age Spawns 'Neo-Luddite' Movement, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1996, at BI (explaining that not everyone
is excited about technological progress). See generally Zachary G. Pascal, Coming Digital Age May Transform
Your Living Room in Many Ways, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1992, at A4 (quoting William Gates Ill, Chairman of
Microsoft, Inc,, as saying that the world is "totally going digital").
2. See, e.g., Judith N. Mott, CEOs Feel Internet's Global impact, INTERNmWEEK, May 25, 1998, at 25
(noting that 78 percent of those polled in China viewed E-commerce as a threat to many traditional businesses);
YvEs L. Doz & GARY HAMMEL, ALLIANCE ADVANTAGE 2 (1998).
3. See Suzanne Muchnic, Going Once, Going Twice in Cyberspace Art: Sotheby's Internet Plans Hail
New Age ofAuctions and StirDebate, Feb. 23, 1999, at Fl (describing Sotheby's planned "virtual auctions" and
the criticism attacking their methods for doing so).
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click of a computer mouse,4 and wireless technology is quickly replacing its
terrestrial equivalents.5 Society is clearly affected by a changing technological
landscape through altered social, personal, and commercial behaviors. Pagers,
email, and mobile phones provide individuals greater convenience in
communication. The convergence of high-technology products and falling prices
results in consumers being able to do more for less. This explosion in high-
technology goods and services is increasingly the end result of inter-business
cooperation in the form of joint ventures and strategic alliances. Inter-business
cooperation has a spillover effect on the legal field, especially in the area of
antitrust, and it has not been felt more profoundly than at the present time. The
dynamic and global nature of high-technology markets is forcing the European
Union (EU) to adjust its antitrust analysis under Article 85 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community6 to accommodate and facilitate
high-technology innovation, competition, and European competitiveness. Article
85 is an important tool used to advance the economic and social goals set out in the
EEC Treaty.7 This Comment discusses the European Commission's past and present
application of Article 85 on high-technology joint ventures and alliances through
an examination of the Commission's case law.
The evolution of the railroad industry provides an illustrative example of how
commercial interests seized upon the advent of new technology and propelled
society down the path of progress. The first reported self-propelled steam vehicle
was created in Beijing around 1681.8 This eventually gave way to the invention of
the locomotive in 1813 and later the development of a railroad-based economy.9
The monumental societal effects that flowed from this technological change
included the restructuring of non-railroad industries. Factories that previously
needed easy access to rivers and canals for transportation purposes could now
relocate near any train tracks.'0 Farmers and coal mines could sell their products to
4. See generally Martin H. Samson, Click Wrap Agreement Held Enforceable, N.Y. L. J., June 30, 1998
(visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.Ijx.com/intemet/0630click.html> (describing the case Hotmail Corporation
v. Van Money Pie Inc., (N.D, Cal., Apr. 20, 1998), as the first judicial pronouncement in the U.S. regarding the
subject of click-wrap agreements).
5. See Richard A. Shaffer, Data Take to the Skies, FORBES, Apr. 15, 1991, at 114 (noting that because
wireless technology is transforming the communications industry someday the "skies will be filled with wireless
invoices, memos, graphical images and perhaps even interoffice video"); see also Scott Thurm & Jeff Cole, Head
in the Clouds?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1999, at R25 (describing various companies plans for a wireless satellite-
based Internet network).
6. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-U) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. The EU has recently changed the numbering of the
EEC Treaty Articles. Article 85 is now Article 81. For convenience, this Comment refers to the former Article
number.
7. See discussion infra Part ll.A.
8. See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITFANNICA, vol. 28, Macropmdia (15th ed. 1991) at 765.
9. See id. at 765-66.
10. Id.; see also BRUCE WILLIAM DEARSTYNE, RAILROADS AND RAILROAD REGULATION IN NEW YORK
STATE, 1900-1913 1 (1986) (stating that the railroads drove New York's Erie Canal into obsolescence).
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distant markets cheaper and faster." This evolution from a steam-propelled vehicle
to locomotive took hundreds of years, yet more recently, the invention of the
electric telegraph in the 1800s has given way to paging, video-conferencing, and
wireless communications all within the last 100 years. The last 50 years has
evidenced the computer's huge leap in power and utility while inducing the creation
of a cashless society.12 Businesses have not sat idle amidst recent technological
changes.
Technological advances compels a business to adapt its behaviors accordingly
in order to survive competition in its particular market. Often times it is crucial to
predict the obsolescence of a current technology or ascertain future trends so as to
gain the early advantage over competitors. For instance, in the late 1980s, I.B.M.
found out that unsuccessfully forecasting the future trend of the personal computer
market has serious business consequences. 3 One corporate behavior used in order
to adapt to technological change is the formation of a joint venture. The rate of
joint-venture formation has increased in the last several decades, and a relatively
new partnering arrangement called a "strategic alliance" is increasingly being used
as well.' 4 These two partnering strategies are disproportionately being used in the
high-technology industries as compared to other industries. This is due to the
blistering pace of technological change that necessitates companies to stay on top
of the learning curve in order to compete.' 5 To stay competitive, companies use the
joint-venture and alliance methods of partnering so as to gain access to each other's
technology which they do not have time to develop on their own. t6 This sharing of
technology results in superior products brought to the market in a quicker time. It
also encourages competitors to do the same if they too do not have the technology
needed to compete. Another reason for forming these types of arrangements is the
global nature of commerce. It is costly to enter new foreign markets. Because time
is crucial in the high-technology field, joint ventures and alliances are a quick way
11. See id. (adding the example that the bridge-building industry was suddenly stimulated).
12. See Bangemann Report, Recommendations to the European Council, Europe and the Global
Information Society, at 8, available at <http://www.echo.lu/eudocs/en/report.html>.; see also Ky Henderson,
Casting the Net: Electronic Cash Just Waiting to be Caught, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr., 1998, at 8 (describing
the rise of electronic cash); DOZ & HAMMEL, supra note 2, at 2.
13. See Dennis Kneale, et al., IBM Unveils Family of New PCs, Fueling Competition in Industry, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 3, 1987, at Al (describing IBM's lost profits).
14. John R. Harbison & Peter Pekar, Jr.,A Practical Guide to Alliances: Leapfrogging the Learning Curve,
STRATEGY& Bus., at 1 (1998).
15. Ashoka Mody, Learning Through Alliances, 20 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 151, 152 (1991) ("As new
technologies emerge, the option of experimenting with various combinations to test their technical commercial
potential increases.").
16. See also ROBBiE DOWNINo, EC INFORMAION TEcHNOLOY LAW 11 (1995) ("The growing use of
networks also highlights one of the main characteristics of the [information technology (Ii)] industry today. As
hardware and software become more sophisticated, so it becomes more difficult to ensure that they all work
together. To be compatible, hardware and software must be designed so that they understand the same set of
instructions.").
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of attaining distribution chains, manufacturing facilities, local talent, and
technology geared for a particular market.
However, a change in commercial behavior may provoke adjustments in the
laws that regulate this conduct. Article 85 of the EEC Treaty is one such law used
as an antitrust weapon, and its application is undergoing changes. The law regulates
agreements between businesses so as to prohibit those agreements that restrict
competition and are counter to the prescribed goals of the EU's competition
policy.t7 This law was enacted in a time when steel, coal, and oil industries
dominated the attention of antitrust authorities. Because Article 85 was created
primarily for regulating dominant industries in past decades, they are ill-suited for
new high-technology industries-those that are newly created and those that were
a fraction of their size and importance thirty years ago. The use of joint ventures
and strategic alliances in high-technology businesses pose particular antitrust
concerns for the Commission because of the close and cooperative relationship
inherent in these arrangements. The Commission stated, "[b]y exchanging
information connected with their competitive ability they not only destroy the
independence of their market conduct but also remove uncertainty as regards to
their future behaviour towards their competitors."'18 The Commission is concerned
that this cooperation that reduces the number of competitors and the level of
competition in the market will be economically harmful to consumers. For example,
joint ventures that involve research collaboration suppress research competition
because what was once two or more companies racing to create a new product is
now only one entity. The incentive to research at high speed to outwit competitors
disappears and technological innovation may slow down.' 9 The Commission must
also face the likelihood that rapid change in technology may render yesterday's
analysis as completely off-topic today.2' An additional concern is technological
convergence and the resulting confusion surrounding product market definition, an
essential tool in Article 85's analysis. The other side of the coin is that many types
of restrictive vertical and horizontal agreements have long been recognized as
having major pro-competitive benefits.
17. Due to what has been phrased as an "identity crisis," the term "European Community" is often used
in literature instead of "European Union" when describing the group of nations that have signed the EEC Treaty.
18. Commission Decision No. 77/5431EEC, 1977 OJ (L 215) 11, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 69; see also DOZ
& HAMMEL, supra note 2, at 8. Please note that European materials quoted in this Comment typically contain
European English grammar.
19. Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures, 795 PLIICorp 619, 630 (1992).
20. Id. at 629; see also Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust:
Striking the Right Balance, 4 HIGH TECH. U. 1, 3 (1989); Speech by Robert Pitofsky to American Bar
Association (Feb. 25-26,1999), available at<http://www.ftc.govlspeecheslpitofsky/hitch.htlm> (last visited Nov.
10, 1999).
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The Commission's fear of restricted competition is tempered with the
awareness of the beneficial impact that technology has on society.2' There is an
incessant worry that seemingly beneficial behavior might fall prey to inflexible
competition laws originally intended to curb harmful monopolistic behavior.2'
Stifling the growth of innoVation is a justified fear considering the increasing role
technology plays in our lives. Sixty percent of jobs in the EU will be connected to
the information technology industries by the year 2000.23 As of 1996, the
information technology sectors constituted US$600 billion in earnings in the EU
alone.24
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of the EU and relevant antitrust
laws. It then describes the traditional goals of the EU and the competition policy
that has developed in order to achieve those goals. Finally, Part II identifies the
changes the Commission and other governmental organizations are seeking with
regards to high-technology industries. Part Ir outlines the Commission's case law
history in recent years to determine if the new competition policy discussed in Part
II is being applied, and if so, to what extent it differs from the traditional policy.
Part IV of this paper describes the characteristics and recent popularity of strategic
alliances.25 It then examines the Commission's analysis with regards to a number
of strategic alliance cases, including: Olivetti-Digital, BT-MCI, Atlas,
Phoenix/GlobalOne and Unisource. Finally, Part V offers observations as to the
possible differences in joint-venture analysis versus the strategic-alliance analysis
and whether we are seeing the first footprints of a new breed of analysis within the
strategic alliance cases. Part V then highlights the most recent antitrust
developments and the new direction of competition policy.
21. Awareness of the importance of technology seems to manifest itself in Article 85(3) text, which
provides that technological progress should be considered when deciding whether an anti-competitive agreement
is to be prohibited. Liberalization of technology industries appears to be dominating the Commission's efforts to
do so.
22. See discussion infra notes 52-6 and accompanying text.
23. Herbert Ungerer, EC Competition Law in the Telecommunications, Media, and Information Technology
Sectors, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1111, 1113 (1996).
24. Id. (noting that predictions have this amount rising to US$3 trillion by the end of the decade).
25. This paper generally mentions cases within the last 15 years. The occasional mention of cases involving
companies other than those in high technology is done mainly to illustrate generally applicable points.
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II. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL BASIS OF EU COMPETITION POLICY
It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by
strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in
natural opposition to it.
26
The EU was founded on a Constitution that outlined certain goals for the union
to accomplish. What follows is a description of these goals and the traditional
competition policy the Commission developed in order to achieve these goals.
Springing from the traditional framework is a redirection of competition policy with
regards to high-technology industries.
To understand the competition concerns that led to Article 85 of the EEC
Treaty, it is useful to know Europe's historical concerns regarding the behavior of
businesses. The above John Stuart Mill quote may not have been in the minds of the
framers who launched the EEC Treaty, but the concept was assuredly a motivating
factor. Because the ravages of World War II lead to economic disintegration, a
number of Western European nations attempted to rebuild and to thwart future
armed conflict by signing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in
1951.27 Buoyed by the economic success of the ECSC Treaty, the six members
further tied their economic success to each other in 1957 by creating a common
market based on full economic union between member states.28 The six European
nations signed the EEC Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community..29
The antitrust law developed since then has been consistently based on a finite set
of goals set out in the EEC Treaty.
26. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 582 (Sir William Ashley ed., Augustus M. Kelley (1909)) (1987).
27. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951 [hereinafter
ECSC].
28. See BELLAMY & CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION §1-002 (Vivien Rose ed., 4!h ed.
1993) [hereinafter BELLAMY & CHILD]. The six nations included: France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium,
and Luxembourg. Id. § 1-005. The nations that have since been added to the EEC include: United Kingdom
(1973), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), Greece (1981), Spain (1986), and Portugal (1986). Id. at §1-004.
Membership expansion continued into 1995, when Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union.
Additional applications for membership have been received from Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey. Members of the
European Parliament 5th Term: 1999-2004 (visited Nov. 28, 1999) <http://www.europarl.eu.int/members
/en/defaulLhtm>.
29. The EEC Treaty is often referred to by commentators as The Treaty of Rome. For a thorough
explanation of the European Union's legal and political structure, see generally Darryl S. Lew, Note, The EEC
Legislative Process: An Evolving Balance, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679 (1989); TIMOTHY MILLEr, THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1990); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw (2d ed. 1988); RAWLINSON & MALACHY CORNWELL-KELLY, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2d ed. 1994); C.S. KERSE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROCEDURE (3d ed.,
1994); UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 1982); K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1994).
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A. Traditional Competition Policy
The Commission's antitrust analysis is based on, and must advance, established
policies and goals set out in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty.30 Article 85 sets out the
criteria that the Commission and the courts will use to determine whether particular
agreements are promoting or discouraging the goals set out in Article 2. One of the
questions this Comment ultimately attempts to answeris whether the current Article
85 analysis of high-technology joint ventures and strategic alliances advances the
goals of competition policy, or whether it strays from the traditional framework and
gives greater weight to goals not outlined in the EEC Treaty.
The operational framework of the EU's competition policy is the maintenance
of a free market economy in order to maximize economic efficiency.31 It is difficult
to identify the precise economic model used to support this framework. The
economic model hinges on the degree to which the government interferes with the
free market, and this interference depends on the particular industry and market.
However, with regards to high technology, the trend is clearly towards a hands-off
approach. If not only because of the impossibility of a perfectly competitive market,
the EU, and other nation states, use antitrust agencies to pursue other values and
policies besides economic efficiency.3 2 These goals are stated alongside the
economic aims in Article 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty.33 The framers of the Treaty
established as their goal the "promot[ion] throughout the Community a harmonious
and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and
solidarity among Member States." 34 Article 3 then mandates certain activities the
EU must perform in order to advance the goals listed in Article 2. These mandates
must be read alongside the general goals of Article 2 in order to fully understand
30. The attitude of European countries, carried on to the EU, was that large, dominate firms in a particular
industry were not an overwhelming worry because Europe was trying to achieve economies of scale that could
compete with other countries' firms. Telecommunications is an example of an industry the Commission has
targeted for abolishment of market fragmentation. Commission XVth Report On Competition Policy 1985,
Introduction [hereinafter XVth Report], reprinted in COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES 829, 830 (DJ. Gijlstra ed., 1985). The many nations within Europe created fractured markets which were
relatively small compared to the Soviet Union, United States, and Canada. Furthermore, general European
industrial competition policy has taken on a shape influenced by such social factors as concern for class conflict
and collective identity. Brian Bercusson et al., A Manifesto for Social Europe, 3 EUR. L.J. 189 (1997). This social
dimension is seen as having faded as a priority in favor of a more free market orientation, which is seen by the
authors as a threat to the social and political foundations of the European Union. See id. at 190.
31. See EEC TREATY, supra note 6, art. 3a(1).
32. See Terry Calvani, What is the Objective of Antitrust?, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW
1,7 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 1988) (stating that a few of the other values pushed are income
redistribution, protection of small business, local control of business, and concentration of political power).
33. EEC TREATY, supra note 6.
34. Id. art. 2.
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the EU's competition policy. 35 And even though high technology is treated
differently, the goals are still the chief aims of competition policy in those sectors
as well.
The Commission was given the power to modify its Article 85 analysis and the
power to create regulations. To promote simplicity and predictability in the law, the
Commission has outlined in its annual Report on Competition what it considers to
be objectives of its competition policy.36 Not only does it discuss the important
cases decided in the prior year, but it often times contains clues as to where the
competition policy is headed.
The First Report set the tone regarding Article 85 analysis, and it emphasized
several competition policy goals: (1) "to prevent governmental barriers from being
replaced by similar measures of a private nature,"37 (2) "to maintain or create
effective competition," 38 and (3) "to encourage efficiency, innovation, and lower
prices., 39 The Commission was unequivocal in the First Report that a large dose of
free market principles would achieve these ends.40 The First Report stated that
"decentralized decision making machinery" and the presence of competition is the
"sine qua non for a steady improvement in living standards and employment
prospects.",4' They remarked that this approach to competition policy is an
"essential means for satisfying to a great extent the individual and collective needs
of our society."42 It should be noted that the Commission's discussion focused on
competition "within" the Common Market. As we will see later, "competition"
35. See UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INT'L ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 414 (Barry
Hawk ed., 1983).
36. The First Report on Competition Policy was published in 1972. Commission First Report on
Competition Policy 1971, Introduction [hereinafter First Report], reprinted in COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1407 (DJ. Gijlstra ed., 1985). Commission XXVth Report On Competition
Policy 1992, Introduction [hereinafter XXVth Report] (recognizing that competition rules have often been
complex, the Commission states that it is pursuing a policy to inform the public through press releases,
conferences, and the Competition Reports in order to "enhance transparency, legal certainty and predictability").
The Commission is aware of the need for predictability in laws to promote capital investment.
37. See BELILAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 1-071.
38. See First Report, supra note 36, Introduction; BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 1-071. Also,
perhaps this was seen as related to employment creation as it is seen today. Margarida Afonso, A Catologue of
Merger Defenses Under European and United States Antitrust Law, 33 HARV. LJ. 1, 8 (1998). The jobs in the
Information Society are estimated to be 60% of total jobs by year2000. Id.
39. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 1-071; see also Valentine Korah, From Legal Form Toward
Economic Efficiency-Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty in Contrast to U.S. Antitrust, 35 Anti. Bull. 1010, (1990).
These ends are seen as a way of "improving the working conditions" of European peoples and "reducing the
differences in prosperity between regions."
40. See First Report, supra note 36, Introduction. This embrace of competition that they avow to was
absent in the telecommunications industries until over a decade later, when they made a relatively rapid
readjustment of the competition model that was heavy on the hands offway of doing things; see also XVth Report
on Competition, supra note 30, Introduction (reaffirming the importance of competition by stating that "innovative
competition, led by entrepreneurs, is the life-blood of the economy").
41. Id.
42. Id.
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gives way to the outright embrace of European Union "competitiveness" as an
important element of Article 85 analysis, and possibly a goal in and of itself.
43
The goals of Article 2 have not been the only ends contemplated by the
Commission. As the laws have matured and grown more sophisticated, practitioners
should be aware of the Commission's periodic injection of new concerns that weigh
into their analysis. The Commission has stated in regulations that "fairness" is an
important value" as is the existence of small and medium sized firms.4' A recent
Commission Notice made it clear that small and medium-sized companies are
rarely capable of significantly affecting trade and competition.46 One of the
Commission's "objectives is to enable structural over-capacity to be eliminated to
enable the industries concerned to recover profitability."'47 In what seems to be an
increasing concern, as manifested by their focus on the competitive edge of
European firms, the EU steadfastly promotes technological development.48 With the
increasing number of social objectives of competition policy, economic efficiency
appears to be playing a smaller role and is perhaps a shrinking concern. 49 Not
expressly stated in the EEC Treaty or the First Report was any mention of a need
to maintain a competitive edge over competing economies, notably Japan or North
America. However, commentators have noted that this was on the minds of the
43. An example of how disproportionate private business research and development (R&D) budgets were
in the recent past, a survey in the late 1980s of the largest R&D budgets showed that U.S. companies comprised
nine of the top seventeen companies. Japanese firms represent four of the seventeen, and European firms
represented only four. See HIGH TECHNOLOGY EUROPE: STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 18
(Phillip de Woot ed., 1990).
44. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1984/83, 1983 OJ. (L 173); Commission Regulation 123/85, 1985
OJ. (L 15). The elusive definition of "fairness" is illustrated in the First Report when they state that government
subsidies in the "Community's interests" are not unfair. First Report, supra note 36.
45. Commission XVIth Report on Competition Policy 1986, at points 22-3; see also Commission XXth
Twentieth Report on Competition Policy 1991 [hereinafter XXth Report]; DOWNING, supra note 16, at 32 (noting
that the small firm is protected at the expense of efficiency, or stated another way, "society is paying for choice").
See, e.g., Commission Decision 88/87, 1987 OJ. (L 50), (1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 54 (Enichem/ICI); Commission
Decision 88/330, 1989 OJ. (L 150), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 24 (Bayer/BP Chemicals).
46. Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the meaning of Article
85(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 1997 OJ. (C 372) at point 19 ("In cases where such
agreements exceptionally meet the conditions for the application of [Article 85(1)], they will not be of sufficient
Community interest to justify any intervention. This is why the Commission will not institute any proceedings,
either on request or on its own initiative, to apply the provisions of Article 85(1) to such agreements, even if the
thresholds set out in points 9 and 10 [of this Notice] are exceeded.").
47. Spencer W. Walter, Symposium: Perspectives on Efficiencies and Failing Firms in Merger Analysis,
64 ANTITRUST LJ. 703,713 (1996) (quoting the XXth Report on Competition Policy).
48. See Commission XXI Report on Competition Policy 1993, at points 47-53.
49. See Korah, supra note 39, at 1010 (stating that efficiency is not the most important goal of the EC,
however it is an important concern). It has even been suggested that the Commission rarely looks at this factor
or it has been assumed for horizontal joint ventures; see also Robert Pitofsky, A FrameworkforAntitrust Analysis
of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. LJ. 1605, 1615 (1986) (stating that in the U.S. any plausible future scenario will lead
them to conclude efficiency exists).
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framers.50 Recent Commission decisions show an increased concern for maintaining
competitiveness with other nations' businesses. 5 Global competitiveness concerns
are now regularly discussed in the annual Reports on Competition.52
The traditional Article 85 analysis involves all three provisions in that Article,
two of which will receive the most attention in this Comment. The first provision
is Article 85(1), which exercises authority over "agreements between undertakings"
that "may affect trade between Member States" and which will prevent, restrict, or
distort competition. 5' This three part analysis establishes whether or not the
agreement falls within Article 85(1). If the agreement satisfies Article 85(1),
meaning it is "caught" by the Article, then Article 85(2)54 declares that the
agreement is prohibited. Article 85(3) is an escape valve for those agreements
caught within Article 85, but which the Commission perceive as having more
benefits to competition than drawbacks. The Commission essentially goes from
deciding whether an agreement is within Article 85(1) to deciding if it satisfies
getting an individual exemption by Article 85(3). 5 Antitrust law that has developed
since then has been fairly methodical and unhurried-this is less so with high
technology.
B. High-Technology Competition Policy
Because high technology is increasingly important for society, it follows that
strategic coordination in the high-technology sectors is more of a necessity than in
low-tech industries. Technological change directly influences the rate of economic
growth,56 and the coordination and free flow of information is vital to the efficient
50. See David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Competition Policy, 35 HARV. ILNT'L
LJ. 97, 102 (1994).
51. See Commission Dec. 86/405, 1986 OJ. (L236) at point 59 (Optical Fibres) (expressing worries that
Europe's high-technology industries may be left behind by other developed nations).
52. See XVth Report, supra note 30, at 829 (remarking that one of the Commission's "top priorities" is
to strengthen the economy so that it will "improve international competitiveness"); see also XXVth Report, supra
note 36, Introduction (stating that in order to achieve the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress, and
the flexibility to adjust to a changing environment, competition and competitiveness belong together).
"Competition policy and competitiveness policy are thus not contradictory but rather serve the same goals of
creating the essential conditions for the development and maintenance of an efficient and competitive Community
industry, bringing better products and services to European citizens, and providing a stable economic
environment." Id. "The introduction of competition to [the telecommunications markets] is also vital to facilitate
the transition to the information society, and thus our ability to survive in an increasingly competitive and global
market." Id. at 17.
53. The term "undertakings" means almost any legal or natural person engaged in economic activity.
BELLAMY & CHILD supra note 28, § 2-003.
54. Article 85(2) of the EEC TREATY states: "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
article shall be automatically void."
55. See generally BETIAMY & CHILD, supra note 28 (discussing Article 85 procedures).
56. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 20, at 9 (citing studies that indicate "90 percent of the long-term
increases in output per capita in the U.S. was attributable to technological change, increased educational levels,
and other factors ... [and] that 'advances of knowledge' contributed about 40 percent of the total increase in
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development and commercialization of new technology and the establishment of
links to developers of complementary technology developers. 57 Close coordination
has become more acceptable from political and legal standpoints.
The last fifteen years have seen a dramatic shift in the EU's focus on
competition policy. The high-technology sectors have been the target of a major
liberalization process that continues to this day.58 These relatively new alterations
in policy were sparked by the British Telecommunications 9 case in the early 1980s.
This case was the first to hold that Article 85 applied to the telecommunications
sector, which included the national monopoly carriers, all still existing at the time.
This was followed by the Commission's 1984 Action Programme6° which outlined
their new liberal policy approach towards the telecommunications sector. This
report was followed by a Commission Green Paper recommending the liberalization
of the telecommunications industry.6' The Telecommunications Green Paper set up
a "comprehensive policy framework for EC action in the telecommunications
industry."62 These efforts lead to similar liberalization efforts regarding satellite
communications 63 and mobile communications.6" The Telecommunications Green
Paper made clear the Commission's concern with Europe's high-technology
competitiveness and it recognized that information exchange is of "vital importance
in economic activity and in the balance ofpower in the world today."65 Stated quite
national income per person employed during 1929-57') (citation omitted).
57. See id. at 20. The rapid change in "high tech" means that the diffusion of information needed in order
for there to be an efficient market interactions are tougher. Id.
58. See generally Commission white Paper on Modemisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and
86 of the EC Treaty, Commission Programme No. 99/027 (1999), available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/
entente/other.htm#dgiv..pdfwb_modemisation.html>.
59. Commission Decision 82/861, 1985 O.J. (L 41), [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 457. This specific issue was
presented on appeal in Italy v. Commission, Case C-41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 873, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 382.
60. COM(84) 277.
61. Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on
the Development of a Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 Final
(1987) [hereinafter Telecommunications Green Paper]. For a complete discussion on the history of
telecommunications regulation, see SA'ID MOSTESHAR, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION (1993).
62. See Ungerer, supra note 23, at 1119.
63. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS IN EUROPE 11 (Joachim Scherer ed., 3d ed. 1995), citing
Commission of the European Communities, Towards Europe-Wide Systems and Services: Green Paper on a
Common Approach in the Field of Satellite Communications in the European Community, COM(90)490 Final
(1990). This essentially extended the new liberal policy regarding telecommunications to the satellite area.
64. See generally Council Recommendation on the coordinated introduction of public pan-European
cellular digital land-based mobile communications in the Community, 87/371 1987 OJ. (L 196) (establishing the
European-wide digital mobile communications (GSM) standard); Council Directive on the frequency bands to be
reserved for the coordinated introduction of public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile
communications in the Community, 87/372 1987 OJ. (L 196) (reserving specific frequencies for the GSM);
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS IN EUROPE, supra note 63, at 9, citing Commission of the European Communities,
Towards the Personal Communications Environment: Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Mobile
and Personal Communications in the European Community, COM(94)145 Final (1994).
65. Telecommunications Green Paper, supra note 63, at "Opening Statement."
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bluntly, the "traditional form of organization of the sector does not allow critical
development of the potential" of the new information technology services.6
In 1993, the call for liberalization of the high-technology sectors, particularly
the information technology sector, took on a dire tone in a comprehensive
Commission report.' The Delors White Paper exemplifies the redirection of high-
technology competition policy. The Preamble states in the first sentence that the
paper is designed to aid the E.U. in "lay[ing] the foundations for sustainable
development of European economies, thereby enabling them to withstand
international competition while creating the millions ofjobs that are needed." The
concept behind the Delors White Paper is that maintaining technological
competitiveness with the industrialized world is crucial to attain the Article 2 goal
of high employment.69 The dire tone of the paper includes warnings that to
"safeguard the future" Europe must not fall behind the other leading technological
nations.70 It argues that the future must be built on a healthy, open, decentralized,
and more competitive economy. In order to attain this new system, the paper calls,
not just for less government interference, but an outright affirmative action to catch
up with their competitors-no doubt that the United States and Japan are their main
worries.
An equally passionate call for change in high-technology competition policy
was made in the Bangemann Report7' of 1994. This report to the European Council
had a desperate tone and was nothing less than a direct call to arms for an
immediate change in competition policy as it pertains to high-technology industries.
The central theme of this report is that the information technology is revolutionizing
the structure of society to such a potentially beneficial extent that European
businesses must be a competitive supplier of products. The consequence of a
dawdling Europe is nothing less than the downward spiral of Europe's standard of
66. Id. at opening statement. Many recommendations in the Telecommunications Green Paper were set
into law in 1991 and 1993 in various Directives. Id.
67. COM(93)700 Final Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward
into the 21st Century: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council [hereinafter Delors White
Paper].
68. Id. at 1.
69. In fact, the report says unemployment is only one reason for the paper. Id. pt. A. Unions have pushed
the idea that scientific research and a technology strategy are needed to maintain high employment. David
Dickson, Eureka, 6 TECH. REV. 26,30 (1988). Foran economic analysis oftechnological change and employment,
see PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFTECHNoLOGICAL CHANGE 12 (1983).
70. The paper goes so far as to state, "Mhroughout the world production systems, methods of organizing
work and consumption patterns are undergoing changes which will have long-term effects comparable with the
first industrial revolution." Id. at Part A, Development Theme I, (1). The actions plan consists of five points (list)
(on p.4 theme 11). The guidelines proposed for a policy of global competitiveness includes four points (p.11, B,
ch.2 theme I) see annex. start with B, ch 5.
71. Bangemann Report, supra note 12.
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living.72 This increased concern for European competitiveness was apparent, as it
was discussed more so than European-wide competition. Becoming a significant
player in high technology is a "means to achieve so many of the Union's
objectives. 7 3 A substantial element in becoming a competitive participant in the
Information Society is changing the regulatory environment to allow for full
competition.74
The new policy framework for the telecommunications, media, and information
technology sectors is outlined by the information society concept in the
Commission's XXVIth Competition Policy Report.76 The rapid movement of the
high-technology sectors forced the liberalization of many sectors and a new spirit
of openness. The Commission has not forsaken antitrust laws in these sectors even
though their actions show a willingness to let dominant businesses cooperate to a
great extent, especially in the alliance cases."7 The interference by the Commission
will also depend on the amount of liberalization of the relevant markets.78
The Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access
agreements in the telecommunications sector"9 addresses how the traditional case-
law principals apply to the new problems arising in the telecommunications sector.
When analyzing Article 85 cases, the Commission stated there are at least two
relevant markets to consider-the service to be provided to end users and access to
those facilities needed to provide the service, mobile and fixed. 0 It continued,
saying access agreements involving interconnection are considered essential to
72. See id. ch. I, Partnership for Jobs ("We have to act to ensure that [the jobs created by high-technology]
are created here, and soon.") (emphasis added). "The first countries to enter the information society will reap the
greatest rewards. They will set the agenda for all who must follow. By contrast, countries which temporise, or
favour half-hearted solutions, could, in less than a decade, face disastrous declines in investment and a squeeze
on jobs." Id. ch. I.
73. Id. ch. I, A Revolutionary Challenge to Decision Makers; see also Michael B. Albert et al., THE NEW
INNOVATORS: GLOBAL PATENTING TRENDS IN FIVE SECTORS (1998) (another method of enhancing European
competitiveness is state subsidies for research and development (R&D) in high technology. The EU spent an
estimated $18billion over five years to bolster Europes' science and technology base).
74. See Bangeman Report, supra note 12, ch. I.
75. This term is meant to label the future societal state that will be achieved through the diffusion of
informational technologies that are changing the basic structure ofsociety. See Towards the Informational Society,
The EC Information Society Promotional Office (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http:lwww.ispo.cec.belinfosoc/
backg/statement.html>.
76. See Commission XXVIth Report on Competition Policy 1994, at point 65 [hereinafter XXVIth Report]
(announcing that "competition policy play[s] a highly active role in enabling the information society to grow");
see also Ungerer, supra note 23, at 1111.
77. See discussion infra notes 280-408 and accompanying text discussing strategic alliances. The
Commission remarked that the liberal attitude of high-technology's industrial restructuring does not preclude
imposing bans. XXVIth Report, supra note 76, at point 66.
78. See-XXVIth Report, supra note 76, at point 66 (stating that the conditions the Commission attaches
to the agreements exemption from an Article 85 violation are dependant on the degree of liberalization,
particularly alliance cases).
79. 1988 OJ. (C 265) [hereinafter Commission Notice on Access].
80. XXVIth Report, supra note 76, at point 45.
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inter-operability of services and infrastructure."1 The Telecommunications Access
Notice identified several types of agreements that concern the Commission. First,
an exchange of confidential information concerning a competitor's customer and
traffic is easily used for collusive purposes.82 Second, exclusivity arrangements
require an Article 85(3) analysis.8 3 Third, access agreements with an anti-
competitive object are very unlikely to qualify for an exemption under Article
85(3).' 4 The Commission stated that it will pay particular attention to access
agreements pertaining to their likely effects on relevant markets.8 5 Finally, third-
party discrimination of access via product pricing, quality, or other "commercially
significant aspects" is also disfavored. 6 With the Commission's concerns in mind,
it is necessary to determine how Article 85 is applied in high-technology joint
ventures and strategic alliances cases.
Im. EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S ANALYSIS OF HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY JOINT VENTURES
The amount of positive attention the EU has directed towards high-technology
industries indicates its favored status among all industries.8 ' Telecommunication,
media, and the pharmaceutical industries have benefitted from the Commission's
desire to decentralize, privatize, and increase international competitiveness. 88 What
81. See id. at point 133. The Commission and the ECJ rarely uses the "essential facilities" terminology
even though the effect of the doctrine is incorporated in their analyses; see also John Temple Lang, Defining
Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J 437, 439 (1994). The leading case on essential facilities is ICI v. Commission, where the
court said: "iThere is a duty to supply at least when: the dominate company is a monopoly; the refusal affects
on of the principal users, a former customer, no objective justification is apparent; and the refusal gravely affects
the conditions of competitions in the EC."
82. See Commission Notice on Access, supra note 79, at point 139.
83. See id. at point 140. The Commission stated:
Exclusivity arrangement, for example where traffic would be conveyed exclusively through the
telecommunications network of other parties with whom access arrangements have been concluded
will similarly require analysis under Article 85(3). If no justification is provided for such routing, such
clauses will be prohibited. Such exclusivity clauses are not, however, an inherent part of
interconnection agreements.
id.
84. See id. at point 141.
85. See id. at point 142. The Commission is worried about hidden price fixing for end-prices for end-users,
especially in oligopolistic markets. Id. An oligopoly is a market with few competitors. FRANK FISHWICK, MAKING
SENSE OF COMPETITION POLICY 47 (1993) (defining an oligopolistic market).
86. Commission Notice on Access, supra note 79, at point 143.
87. See Council Resolution concerning trans-European Networks, 1990 OJ. (C 27).
88. Interestingly, the Internet has been the subject offew Commission decisions and Court cases. See Philip
Ruttley, E.C. Competition Law in Cyberspace: An OverviewofRecentDevelopments, [1998] E.C.L.RI 186 (1998).
Cf. Michael H. Ryan, Competition in the Provision of On-line Services: The U.K. Approach to the Problem of
Vertical Integration, [1997] 7 E.C.L.R. 435 (discussing the dominance of the national telecommunications
operators in the provision of on-line services market). The Commission may be waiting for the United States law
to develop in this area because of the head start the United States has regarding Internet issues. This would allow
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follows is a step-by-step look at how the Commission analyzes high-technology
industries when applying Article 85. The procedural steps are outlined, and case
examples from different high-technology industries are woven into this material.
The Commission's comments are instructive to those businesses that have not yet
formed a joint venture because the Commission's main concerns are typically
discussed therein. Before that analysis is described, it must be made clear what is
meant by a "joint venture."
A. Definition of a Joint Venture
The first significant hurdle is to determine whether a company's agreements
equate to the creation of a joint venture, or as the Commission terms it, a
"cooperative joint venture." Solving this question means starting with the
Commission's definition of a joint venture.
Article 3(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/8989 defines joint ventures as an
undertaking under the joint control of several other undertakings," the parents.9'
The core import of the joint-venture definition is the concept of control. The
amount of control will dictate whether or not the joint venture is a concentrative
joint-venture92 versus a cooperative joint-venture. Article 3(3) of Regulation
4064/89 states that control is found when by rights, contracts or any other means
which, either separately or jointly and having regard to the considerations of fact
or law involved, bestow the possibility of exercising "decisive influence" on an
undertaking. 93 The Regulation highlights two examples of how decisive influence
sophisticated law to develop and would allow the Commission to see what works and what does not. For more
information on the EU's policy, see <http:llfgr.wu-wien.ac.atlnentwich/euroint2.html>.
89. O.J. (L 395) at point 1.
90. "Undertaking" means a business or legal entity.
91. This definition of a "cooperative joint venture" was a subsequent clarification of Commission
Regulation 4064/89 in the Commission Notice concerning the Assessment of cooperativejoint ventures pursuant
to Article 85 of the EEC TREATY, 1993 O.J. (C 43) at point 2 [hereinafter Commission Notice on Cooperative
Joint Ventures]. The Regulation states in part:
- all joint ventures, the activities of which are not to be performed on a lasting basis, especially
those limited in advance by the parents to a short time period;
- joint ventures which do not perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity,
especially those charged by their parents simply with the operation of particular functions of an
undertaking (partial-function joint ventures);
- joint ventures which perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function
joint ventures) where they give rise to coordination of competitive behaviour by the parents in
relation to each other or to the joint ventures.
Id. at point 10.
92. If the joint venture is concentrative, then the analysis is significantly different from the cooperative
joint-venture analysis by the fact that it will be analyzed according to Merger Regulation guidelines, which is
regarded as a less demanding Commission analysis. A discussion of concentrative joint-ventures is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a thorough description, see JOINT VENTURES IN EUROPE 5 (Julian Ellison & Edward
Kling eds., 2d ed. 1997).
93. Commission Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 91, at point 4.
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can be exercised. First, the parents own the right to make use of all or part of the
assets of an undertaking.94 Second, rights or contracts which confer decisive
influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking,
are sufficiently decisive.' This suggests that anything other than a 50/50 stake in
ajoint venture between two companies is not a cooperative joint-venture. This has
not been the practical effect, but, instead decisive influence exercised by a party is
determined by the legal and factual circumstances surrounding a case. Once the
nature of the joint venture is established, the next step is to determine the
applicability of Article 85.
B. Jurisdictional and Exemption Issues
One of the most critical steps before an Article 85 analysis is to determine
whether the joint-venture is even subject to the Article's scrutiny. This involves
defining the relevant market96 and ascertaining the parents' existing market share
for the product or services offered, or to be offered, by the joint venture. Certain
types of agreements are automatically void prior to an Article 85 analysis. Opposite
this concept, certain types of agreements that do not have an appreciable affect on
competition are accepted as valid and therefore,, do not require an Article 85
analysis.
1. Per Se Violations and Agreements of Minor Importance
Article 85(1) not only prohibits agreements which restrict competition, 97 it also
lists examples of per se violations.98 Agreements automatically void include the
following: price fixing,9 limiting or controlling production, markets, technical
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The product market in combination with the geographic scope of business establishes the precise
relevant market.
97. Generally, this paper uses the term "restrict" when referring to Article 85(1) to mean restrict, prevent,
or distort competition.
98. Article 85 states:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with
the subject of such contracts.
Article 85(1) does not explicitly set up an articulate and effective rule establishing a per se violation via the
list, but, instead, lends itself to a case by case analysis on whether competition has been or will be affected by the
joint venture agreement.
99. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 4-002.
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development or investment, sharing markets or sources of supply, dealing
exclusively through agreed channels, vertical agreements imposing export bans, or
restricting the buyer's freedom to deal with goods.' °
The Commission's antitrust concerns have spurred the creation of a notification
procedure which companies may exercise.'0' Notification was based on the
aggregate amount of the parents' revenue and their market share for the relevant
product. The Commission issued guidelines establishing a threshold, and exceeding
this threshold meant that the restrictive effect of the joint venture agreement on
competition was considered significant-termed "appreciable"-and subject to
Article 85 analysis. This is called the de minimis test,'02 and it was codified by what
is widely referred to as the Commission Notice of Minor Importance.'0 3 The test
evaluates the dominance of the parties involved by calculating their market shares
and gross revenue.' 4 The test was revised in 1997 with the issuance of a
Commission Notice.105 The 1997 Notice of Minor Importance eliminated the gross
100. Id. § 2-098. On the other side of the coin, the Commission has enumerated specific categories ofjoint-
venture arrangements that will not be considered in violation of Article 85(1) because they do not have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition. These include joint ventures of companies
belonging to the same parent corporation, agreements that have no appreciable restriction on competition, and a
number of agreements listed in the 1968 Notice on cooperation between enterprises, 1993 O.J. (C 43) at point 15.
For a thorough comparison of per se rules and the rule of reason, see Oliver Black, Per Se Rules and Rules of
Reason: What Are They?, [1997] 3 E.C.L.R. 145.
101. See BE.LAMY & CHILD supra note 28, § 11-011 (remarking that any company may elect not to notify
the Commission of their creation of ajoint venture because there is no duty to notify the Commission). There are,
however, severe penalties and no protection from Article 85(1) antitrust violations if the companies do not notify
the Commission and are later found to violate Article 85(1)-thereby creating a significant incentive to notify the
Commission. See id. at § 11-002. The penalties can include: imposition of fines on participating parties; voiding
the joint venture agreement; liability to third parties for damages or an injunction or both. "A principal objective
of notification.., is to secure the legal validity of the agreement by obtaining an exemption under Article 85(3)."
Id. Companies are liable to third parties and subject to fines the moment the joint venture is created. This means
that notification after the fact still may subject the companies to penalties. Id at § 11-012.
102. This test was first established in the European Court of Justice: Case 5/69 V6lk v. Vervaecke [1969]
ECR 295, [1969] C.M.L.R. 273.
103. Commission notice of 3 September 1986 on agreements of minor importance which do not fall under
Article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1986 O.J. (C 231) at point 1
[hereinafter 1986 Notice of Minor Importance] (stating that this agreement was meant to facilitate the cooperation
between small and medium-sized businesses). This replaces the Commission Notice of 19 December 1977, O.J.
(C 313). Id. at n.1.
104. See 1986 Notice of Minor Importance, supra note 103, at point 7 (explaining that an agreement is not
caught by Article 85(1) if (i) the "goods or services which are subject to the agreement ... together with the
participation undertakings' other goods or services which are considered by users to be equivalent in view of their
characteristics, price and intended use, do not represent more than 5% of the total market for such goods or
servies ... in the area of the common market affected by the agreement," and (ii) "the aggregate annual turnover
of the participating undertakings does not exceed 200 million ECU"); see also BELFAMY & CHItLD, supra note 28,
§ 2-105. The test is actually a consideration of the whole economic context in which competition would occur.
However, the two factors listed in the text are the most important. Id. at 2-104. For a detailed analysis and a list
of supporting cases, see generally id. ch. 2.
105. Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the meaning of Article 85(1) of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997 OJ. (C 372) at point 7 [hereinafter 1997 Notice of Minor
Importance].
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 12
revenue component of the de minimis test and set the market share thresholds at five
and ten percent, respectively, for horizontal and vertical arguments. 16 This change
benefits high-technology alliances particularly because by their very definition,
alliances typically adopt a broad network of relationships with large companies.
The quick pace of technological convergence suggests that the chances of small
businesses merging with big businesses are greater.
2. Product Market
Before the Commission can assess any possible Article 85 violation, it must
specify the relevant product market in which the joint venture is engaged.107 This
analysis is meant to identify and define the boundaries of competition between
firms so that the Commission can identify the parent company's "actual competitors
that are capable of constraining those undertakings' behaviour and of preventing
them from behaving independently of effective competitive pressure. [Therefore],
the market definition makes it possible inter alia to calculate market shares [of a
company] that would convey meaningful information regarding market power for
the purposes of assessing dominance or for the purposes of applying Article 85."10s
Recall that when the Commission determines whether a joint-venture agreement
will have an appreciable impact on competition, one important factor is the size of
the parent company's market shares. This market share is calculable only after the
market is defined.
The exact definition of the market can have a bearing on competition policy and
is crucial in a high-technological firm's decision making process. t°9 The product
market analysis is generally based on the concept of demand substitutability.110 That
is, the relevant product market consists of identical products to the ones the joint
ventures produce, or products considered as interchangeable with regard to their
106. See id. at point 9. For a discussion on the usefulness of the "appreciability" standard and market
definition problems, see generally Frances Barr, Editorial, The New Commission Notice on Minor Importance:
Is appreciability a Useful Measure?, [1997] 4 E.C.L.R. 207.
107. XXVIIth Report On Competition Policy 1997, at point 13 ("The definition of the relevant market is
a very important step in the analysis of cases, since it provides the frame of reference against which competition
between the firms concerned has to be assessed."). For an industry specific look at market definition issues, see
generally DOWNING, supra note 16.
108. Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition
law, 1997 OJ. (C 372) at point 2 [hereinafter Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market].
109. See id. at point 4 (stating that the determination of product market and geographic market has a
"decisive influence" on their analysis of a competition case); see also Thomas E. Kauper, The Problem of Market
Definition UnderEC Competition Law, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1682 (1997) (stating that the definition is relevant
to assessing policies which are not always economic).
110. See Kauper, supra note 109. The Commission does not rule out the possibility of using supply
substitutability. Id.
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characteristics, price, or use."' The Commission has stated that products can form
a separate market based on characteristics, price, or use alone, especially where
consumer preferences have developed.1 2 This poses special problems, especially
in the high-technology arena where evolving technology often times means
integrating multiple products into a single product." 3 For example, the utility of
paging, voice telephony, facsimile and other features are distinct, but they may be
interchangeable." 4 The Commission has expressed its wariness of technological
convergence in its decisions and the impact it can have on product market
definition.
An early joint-venture decision in 1991 involved Eirpage, the joint venture
entity created by Motorola Ireland Ltd. (Motorola) and Bord Telecom Eireann
(Telecom)." 5 Eirpage was in the business of paging services and did not
manufacture components of any kind. Its paging service was categorized by the
Commission as falling "within the broader category of mobile communication
services in general, which includes mobile telephones and mobile radios."'"1 6
However, the product market was defined narrowly as "paging services" because
paging is a one-way means of communicating with someone and the relative low
cost to other forms of mobile communication were both distinct features."17 It also
found important that telephones were "larger" and more "unwieldy" than paging
features. This means greater convenience helps distinguish the market."8 Aware
that technological progress soon might render the size and cost distinctions
immaterial, the Commission said that even if these distinctions fade away, "at
present" paging would "continue to exist as a separate option in the mobile
111. BELLAMY & CHILD supra note 28, § 2-106; see also Commission Notice on the Definition of the
Relevant Market, supra note 108, at point 7 ("A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products'
characteristics, their prices, and their intended use.").
112. See 1986 Notice of Minor Importance, supra note 103, at point 11. For an early case on product market
definition, see Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199. For a more modem approach favored by the
Commission, see United Brands v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429 (holding
that the relevant market is bananas and not fresh fruit in general).
113. See Robert A. Levy, Microsoft and the Browser Wars: Fit to Be Ted, Cato Institute, Policy Analysis
No. 296 passim (1998) (describing the incorporation of Microsoft's World Wide Web browser into the Windows
operating system and the legal troubles surrounding the browser).
114. See Ungerer, supra note 23, at 1113. The Commission noted that where the joint-venture contract
components are incorporated into another product produced by the same joint venture, reference should be made
to the end product so long as the components represent a significant part of it. See 1986 Notice of Minor
Importance, supra note 103, at point 12. Where the components are sold to third-party undertakings, reference
should be made to the component market as well. See generally Robert A. Levy, supra note 113, at 3-9
(discussing the problems arising from product integration involving Microsoft).
115. Commission Decision 91/562, 1991 OJ. (L 306) (Eirpage). Telecom was the monopoly
telecommunications service in Ireland and Motorola was a wholly owned subsidiary of Motorola, Inc. in the
United States.
116. Id. at point 4.
117. Id. at point 10 (noting it can be as much as 50% cheaper).
118. Id.
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communications sector because it offers one-way communications, a distinct
advantage in keeping down the billing costs." t 9 This is to say that the one-way
characteristic is enough to render this a distinct product market. The Commission
did not hint as to how they might view the situation where pagers might evolve
from their present characteristics to some form of limited two-way communication,
i.e., sending a limited email or voice response signal. Recent developments in
integrating pager and cell phone technology will force this issue to be addressed
sooner rather than later.
20
Astra 2 1 is another telecommunications case which involved a joint venture
offering television broadcasting services by satellite. British Telecommunications,
United Kingdom's national operator, and SES, a Luxembourg corporation
established for the purpose of operating satellites, formed the 50/50 joint-venture
company BT Astra SA. There were three distinct product markets identified:
satellite space capacity, up-linking services, and down-linking services.'
Unpersuaded by BT's attempt to distinguish the satellite capacity market between
low-powered and medium-powered, the Commission stated that both types of
capacity "offer customers the same possibilities as far as geographic coverage...
[and] transmission to cable head-ends; medium-powered satellites simply offer the
added feature of enabling DTH reception by relatively small receive dishes."'
23
They continued stating that where the cable system in a country is well-developed
and in little need for individual dishes, customers would not know if they are
receiving the programs via low or medium-powered satellites.' 24 This is an
interesting and rarely seen, if ever, twist on the product market analysis.
Substitutability of product assumes that consumers are aware of their choices. This
reasoning in Astra suggests that the lack of knowledge and an inability of the
consumer to notice a difference is a different type of interchangeability analysis.
With regards to the up-link market, the Commission did not state why this was a
distinct market. The obvious facts that it was terrestrial-based, required different
equipment, and was a separable service probably did not force the Commission to
analyze the up-link market.
119. Id.
120. At the time of publication, pagers with two-way messaging capabilities have already been
commercialized. One commentator has mentioned that there are several points worth noting: Telecom was
required to maintain open access to the same facilities that Eirpage enjoyed; the subscribers contracts were for one
year only, so that they could switch services; and that the parent companies were obliged to treat competitors
similarly in the future, even when the Commission lacked proof that the parents maintained a dominant position
or engaged in past discrimination in favor of the joint venture. See John Temple Lang, European Community
Antitrust Law: Innovation Markets and High Technology Industries, 20 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 717,736 (1997).
121. Commission Decision 93/50, 1993 OJ. (L 20) (Astra).
122. Id. at point 5.
123. Id. at point 15.
124. Id. (remarking that the two types of satellites were competing with each other to a certain extent).
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The Optical Fibrest25 case involved fiber optic hardware. Coming Glass Works
(Coming) was a U.S. corporation with interests in glass and ceramic products and
had a turnover in 1984 of US$1,732,700,00.126 In 1970 they developed and patented
optical fibers for use in the telecommunications industry and eventually formed
several joint ventures in Europe for the manufacturing and marketing of optical
fibers. The Commission described the product as a "substitute for microwave and
satellite transmission and for traditional coaxial and copper conductors in the field
of communications."1 27 Considering the Commission's later analysis, it can be
inferred that the use of the word "substitute" in this quote was the colloquial, not
legal, definition. However, the Commission pointed out that theprice for optical
fibers was falling rapidly' and fiber optics were used in a variety of applications.
The Commission limited their delimitation of the optical fiber market by stating
only that "The production of optical fibres and optical cables are different
activities.
' 't29
The merger decision EDS/Scicon131 involving software services was an early
admission by the Commission on how difficult it is to identify the product market:
"Market definition within the services sector is particularly difficult. The
boundaries between the various categories and sub-categories of such services are
blurred. The ability to provide one service often leads to the ability to provide
another. The status necessary to undertake contracts in the various categories are
similar.'' In EDS/SD-Scicon the Commission did not feel it necessary to precisely
define the product markets in the decision even though they admitted that they had
defined sub-markets for there own use. Either defining the markets broadly or
narrowly, they stated that the results would have been the same. 32
There are instances when the Commission treats the goods actually produced
as having no product market, hence no possible Article 85(1) violation. The
Commission's recent KGS 33 decision involved several biotech companies'34 that
set up a joint venture to manufacture the acid KGA. t35 The Commission said that
since KGA is "not traded as a separate product on the market [and] ... there is no
supply and demand" for it, vitamin C should be the relevant product market.
125. Optical Fibres, supra note 51.
126. See id. at point 5.
127. Id. at point 24.
128. Id. at point 36.
129. Id. at point 46.
130. 1991 OJ. (C 237), [1993] 4 C.L.M.RL M77 (EDS/SD-Scicon).
131. Id. at point 8.
132. Id. at point 9.
133. Commission Decision 1998 O.. (C 247) (KGS).
134. The companies included Cerestar Deutschland GmbH, Merck KgaA, and BASF AG.
135. KGS. supra note 133, at point 1. KGA is the intermediate product in the manufacture of vitamin C from
sorbitol.
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In 1994 the parties argued in the Fujitsu AMD Semiconductor36 case that the
production of semiconductor wafers would not constitute the relevant product
market, even though the joint venture was created explicitly to produce that
particular good, because the wafers are "products rarely put on the market before
being cut into chips and incorporated into ... devises."1 37 Therefore, the parties
argued that the relevant product market was the market for the devises.33 The
Commission did not foreclose this argument, but stated that the question would
remain open. 39 The Commission refused to speculate as to future markets that
might develop and concluded that there was no product market for the wafers.140
This is noteworthy because the Commission admitted that there was a market, albeit
very small and intermittent. It is arguable that the Commission may be sympathetic
to the notion that even though the product market is very small-whether based on
monetary amounts or percentage of the market share-the total lack of a market is
not the necessary prerequisite to concluding no relevant product market exists.
However, this may merely be a case where a product is incorporated to a significant
degree into an end product. The Commission did not elaborate on this point. This
may be analogous to their nurturing of small businesses via the 1997 Notice of
Minor Importance. Some markets may be so inconsequential that the Commission
might be willing to establish a threshold over which only the Commission will
concern itself.
3. Geographic Market
The Commission rarely devotes much ink to the geographic market analysis.
Simply, the relevant geographic market is "the area within the Community in which
the agreement produces its effects.' 4' Defining the geographic market is not
necessary for all Article 85 cases because it simply is not relevant for all
decisions. 42 In Fujitsu, the Commission dismissed the issue in four sentences. It
said that the world was the geographic market for the devises in question because
they were freely traded around the world, there were no price differences or
136. Commission Decision No. 941823, 1994 OJ. (L 341) at point 20 (Fujitsu).
137. Id. at point 20 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 1986 Notice on Minor Importance, supra note 103, at point 13 (outlining that wherever the product
cannot be bought or sold, or are bought and sold in limited quantities at irregular intervals, that portion of the
market should be excluded). The geographic market will be narrower than Community-wide when the nature of
the product restricts its mobility and when movement within Community is hindered by barriers-for example,
severe taxation. Id. at point 14.
142. See Kauper, supra note 109, at 1692 (explaining that it is a necessary precondition to Article 86
analysis).
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national barriers, and the transport costs were negligible.43 In the Exxon/ShellM
decision, the Commission devoted only one sentence to explain that the geographic
market was the "whole Community" because the polyethylene products are "safety
[sic] and easily transportable."' 45
With regards to the information-technology sectors, the markets will
increasingly be international or global. These industries are "beset by intense
globalizing pressures," which drives companies to form a network of relationships
in order to be competitive. 46 There is a good chance that any one of the partners
conducts commerce on a global scale, and out of this there may rise a worldwide
standardization of technical standards.1 47 The Bangemann Report declared, "If
appropriate, the notion of a global, rather than a Union-wide, market should now
be used in assessing European competition issues, such as market, joint ventures
and alliances."'
148
4. Article 85(1) Concerns
Article 85(1) provides in part:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market; all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market[.]
The Commission focuses on three factors when determining whether or not an
agreement falls within Article 85(1): (1) whether there is an agreement, decision,
or concerted practice made between or observed by undertakings, (2) whether
competition within the common market may thereby be prevented, restricted, or
distorted, and (3) whether trade between member states may thereby be affected. 149
In fact, a high percentage of joint venture agreements fall within Article 85(1) and
are automatically void according to Article 85(2). As will be discussed later, many
joint ventures escape prohibition through an Article 85(3) exemption.
As the initial step, the Commission typically devotes scant attention in deciding
whether or not there is an "agreement, decision, or concerted practice between
143. See Fujitsu, supra note 136, at point 23.
144. See generally Exxon/Shell, infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
145. Id. at point 13.
146. Bangemann Report, supra note 12, ch. 3, The Role of Competition Policy.
147. See Commission Notice 1992 OJ. (C 333) at point 15 (STET, Italtel, AT&T and AT&T-NSI).
148. Bangemann Report, supra note 12, ch. 3, The Role of Competition Policy.
149. See, e.g., Commission Notice, supra note 113, at points 12-15; see also BELAMY & CHILD, supra note
28, at 38.
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undertakings." Many decisions contain little more than a stock discussion. There
is typically no analysis, but instead there are conclusory assertions that the parties
are undertakings and the transactions between them are agreements.t50 Agreements
do not have to be legally binding contracts. They may be the party's expressed
intentions, written or oral, inferred from the circumstances, or may be evinced by
a continuing business relationship.'5 t
The next step in Article 85(1) analysis is the determination about whether the
joint venture has as its "object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market."1 52 The Commission is very liberal in its
analysis of what "may" affect or restrict competition. This was to be expected from
the outset of the Article's application because as Justice Brandeis of the U.S.
Supreme Court once said, "[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation
of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence."'53 The language
"prevented, restricted, or distorted" of Article 85(1) catches many joint ventures
within its scope. The Commission considers these three operative words as having
different meanings even if their effects are similar. The traditional strict reading and
enforcement of "restriction" has given way to a more liberal interpretation, at times,
which apparently coincides with the Commission's new overall flexible attitude.'"4
For example, in Shell/Exxon1 55 the Commission was faced with a joint venture
for the manufacturing of primarily linear low-density polyethylene (LLDPE), but
with the possibility of producing high-density polyethylene (HDPE). 56 Because
LLDPE was interchangeable with another product called high-pressure low-density
polyethylene (LDPE), not manufactured at the plant, it was also within the product
market. However, when deciding upon whether there was a restriction of
150. This is probably the case because the language in Article 85(1) is very broad and rarely disputed. See,
e.g., Commission Decision 931668, 1993 OJ. (L 306) (Auditel) (illustrating this point, even though it is a non-
joint venture case, that the Commission affords a single sentence to the undertakingi conclusion, the agreements
conclusion; Commission Decision 92/427, 1992 0.. (L 235) (Quantel Intemational-Continuum/Quantel SA) at
points 6-7, 42; Commission Decision 97/123, 1996 O.J. (L 47) (NovalliancelSystemform) at point 52;
Commission Decision 91/532, 1991 O.1. (L 287) (Viho/Toshiba) at point 19. This strategic-alliance case is a good
example how the Article 85(1) element of whether or not the parties are undertakings and whether there exists an
agreement goes entirely without a discussion. This is probably because of the obviousness of the conclusion.
151. See BELLAMY & CILD, supra note 28, § 2-016 (explaining that even if there is no formal agreement,
an informal restriction of competition could give rise to a "concerted practice"). See generally id. § 2-042. See,
e.g., Commission Decision 88/172, 1988 O.J. (L 78) (Konica) at points 37-40.
152. See EEC TREATY, supra note 6, art. 85.
153. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1912). Seemingly, from
its early decisions, it treated any restriction on conduct that was to have important repercussions in the market as
a violation of Article 85(1); see Korah, supra note 39, at 1015. This led to the Commission's establishment of the
de minimis rule in 1970; VALENTINE KORAn, EC COMPmTON LAW AND PRACTICE 60 (5th ed. 1994).
154. Jean-Yves Art & Dirk Van Liedekerke, Developments in EC Competition Law in 1997: An Overview,
35 C.M.L.R. 1135-37, 1135 (explaining the current shift towards a "more economic approach in the enforcement
of EC competition law," [and] especially with regards to the concept of "restriction on competition"). The
Commission "desire[s] to concentrate on cases having a significant effect on competition ..... Id. at 1137.
155. See Commission Decision 94/322, 1994 O.J. (L 144) (Exxon/Shell).
156. Id. at point 2.
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competition, the Commission decided the joint venture did not restrict competition
in the HDPE market. 5 7 Even though Exxon and Shell were recognized as
competitors-almost ensuring the conclusion that restriction exists-the
Commission determined that the restriction was "not significant" because Exxon
and Shell were not big actors in the HDPE market. 5 1 The wording of Article 85(1)
creates a black and white situation in which there is either restriction or there is not.
However, Shell/Exxon illustrates how the Commission inserts a more subjective
analysis by finding that a restriction on competition is not necessarily fatal. This is
notable because unlike this case, a full economic analysis, referred to as the rule of
reason, is not used in Article 85(1). Rather, it is Article 85(3) that allows for the
balancing of interests and the situation as a whole.159 Here, however, the
Commission dismisses the restriction as something trivial and articulates no real
analysis as to the benefits. 6c The Commission was dealing with HDPE, that had a
considerable percentage in the market, versus a less than 1 percent with Volk.
The third element the Commission analyzes is whether the joint venture has an
effect on trade between member states. Business conduct is delimitated by those
behaviors governed by Community law and those behaviors governed by national
law.6 1 The test for determining whether an agreement affects trade was first
established in the ECJ case Socigtj Technique Minire.162 The test has been
reiterated in more recent cases including Remia v. Commission, which stated:
it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the
basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that it may have an
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade
between Member States, such as might prejudice the realization of a single
market in all the Member States.163
157. Id. at point 57 (adding that "in the light ofthe present characteristics of the oligopolistic HDPE market
and of the only partial substitutability of HDPE by polypropylene." there was only an "insignificant restriction
of competition").
158. See id.
159. Mario Siragusa, The Millenium Approaches: Rethinking Article 85 and the Problems and Challanges
in the Design and Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules, 21 FORDHAM INT'LLJ. 650,651 (1998) (stating that
the anti-competitive effects are looked at only in Article 85(3)). The Commission is trying to achieve a fuller
economic analysis in Article 85(1), and if they do, fewer companies would fall afoul of this Article. Id.
160. See Exxon/Shell, supra note 155, at points 57-58.
161. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 2-126 ("The concept of 'effect on trade between Member
States'... enabl[es] Community law to regulate all restrictive agreements having appreciable repercussions at
Community level.").
162. Case 56165, Socidt6 Technique Miniare v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, E.C.R. 337 (1966), at
points 235, 251.
163. Case 42/84, Remia BV v. Commission, E.C.R. 2545 (1985), § 22.
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Trade is deemed to be affected not only when products cross national
boundaries, but even when they are likely to be traded across national boundaries."
An example of this is the Commercial Solvents't case, which held that the
elimination of a competitor, who primarily exported its product rather than supply
the member states, was an effect on trade.
A few high-technology cases have shown that the Commission is willing to use
distortion of competition as a way to condemn agreements even if they are not
restricting competition, but are, nevertheless, violating the spirit of how the
Commission wants competition to operate.'6 The X/Open Groupt 7 decision
involved an agreement, rather than a joint venture, between many large computer
software and hardware manufacturers to create an open industry standard by
selecting existing interfaces for use with AT&T's Unix operating system.1 68 The
Commission found that this agreement distorted competition for the following
reasons: (1) nonmembers cannot influence the work results of the group, and unlike
members, they did not get the technical understanding of these results, (2) non-
members cannot utilize the standard until it was made publicly available, whereas
members had early knowledge of the specifications and can gain a competitive
advantage of this lead time-which was crucial in the high-technology sectors, and
(3) membership was restricted by the Group. 69
There are two noteworthy cases where the Commission analyzed joint-venture
agreements between huge conglomerates. The parties were arguably alliances, even
if they were not labeled as such, and they fell outside the scope of 85(1) analysis.
The cases were International Private Satellite Partners (IPSP) 170 and Iridium.17'
164. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 2-129. "A speculative or contrived possibility is not enough, but
a potential effect is sufficient." Id. § 2-132. If the joint venture involves agreements that directly relate to
international transactions or where the parties are located in different member states, there is a presumption that
trade between member states is effected. id. § 2-219. The author goes on to list additional situations and cases
that illustrate the presumption that trade is effected, including: where the parties operate in several member states;
the agreement applies to more than one Member State; or where the agreement establishes a Community-wide
distribution system. Id. The presumption is triggered even if the agreement is with a subsidiary or branch of a
company that is based in another member state. Id. Agreements that alter the structure of competition within
member states to an appreciable extent, even when the products do not cross national boundaries, are enough to
satisfy this element. Id. § 2-131.
165. Cases 6 & 7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, E.C.R. 223, at points 30-35.
166. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 2-108; see generally id. §§ 4-029 to 4-037 (discussing
information agreements); Commission Decision 87/1, 1987 O.J. (L 3), at points 33-42, [1989] 4 C.L.M.R. 445
(Fatty Acids).
167. Commission Decision 87169, 1986 OJ. (L 35), [1986] 4 C.M.L.R. 542 (XIOpen Group).
"168. Id. at point 9.
169. Id. at point 32-34. The Commission summarized its analysis, saying "an appreciable distortion of
competition ... may result from future decisions of the group on interfaces in combination with decisions on
admission of new members to the group." Id. at point 35.
170. Commission Decision 941895, 1994 OJ. (L 354).
171. Commission Decision 97/39, 1997 OJ. (L 16) (Iridium).
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IPSP was a consortium of international telecommunication firms 172 organized to
provide international business telecommunications services and to offer
transmission capacity on its satellites. The Commission decided that the venture
which operated and maintained the satellite network was of such a nature that no
party could be considered actual or potential competitors. This was because no
party had all the necessary licenses and authorizations, and none could finance,
construct, launch, or operate the satellites alone. 73 The Commission limited its
analysis to licenses the parties presently had. Had the Commission speculated about
what licenses the parties could obtain, it may have found them to be potential
competitors. The Commission also mentioned that this venture would help provide
more options to consumers who were presently limited to the International Satellite
Organizations (ISO). and national systems controlled by the incumbent
telecommunications operators. The Commission found it important that IPSP was
essentially the first competitor in a new market that was not created by eliminating
existing competitors.
The Iridium case also involved a joint venture meant to create a satellite-based
system offering global digital wireless communications services using a
constellation of low earth orbit satellites. t74 The Commission reiterated the same
points contained in the IPSP decision. The venture was too financially and
technically risky to expect anyone to go it alone. Because this would create a new
product market, competition wouldn't be eliminated. This "completely novel" and
"revolutionary" idea was seen as competitive with terrestrial systems. 175
172. They included Orion Satellite Corporation from the US; its parent, Orion Network Systems; British
Aerospace Communications; Coin Dev Satellite Communications Ltd; General Dynamics Commercial Launch
Services, Kingston Communications International Ltd.; MCN Sat US; Societa Finanziaria Telefonica per Azioni
(STED, an Italian company; Trans-Atlantic Satellite, Inc., and its parent, Nissho Iwai Co.
173. See IPSP, supra note 170, at point 55.
174. See Iridium, supra note 171, at point 1. The services included faxing, telephony, and paging. The
market targeted was the "high-end" world travelers. See also DOZ & HAMMEL, supra note 2, at 4.
175. See Iridium, supra note 171, at point 40. The risks became reality when Iridium announced on August
13, 1999, that they filed for bankruptcy protection. Bruce Meyerson, Iridium Files for Protection Dearth of
Customers Leads to Bankruptcy, Deny. Post, Aug. 14, 1999, at C2.
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5. Article 85(3) Concerns
Becausejoint venture agreements falling within Article 85(1) are automatically
void, a joint venture must fit within either a block exemption or an Article 85(3)
individual exemption in order to remain valid. Article 85(3) provides:
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which
does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products
in question.1
76
a. Block Exemptions
The Commission has issued a number of regulations which exempt certain
types of agreements from Article 2 prohibition. The regulations are meant to
facilitate agreements between common undertakings that enhance competition and
are deemed to outweigh any restriction on competition.' 77 This type of exemption
is termed "block exemption." The current block exemptions include the following:
(1) technology transfer agreements, 78 (2) research and development agreements,
179
176. See EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 85(3).
177. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28; see also James Ashe-Taylor, Strategic Alliances: EC
Competition Law, 1063 PRAC. L. INST/CORP. L. & PRAc. 515, 518 (1998), available at WESTLAW, 1063
PLI/Corp 515 (describing the use of block exemptions as a way to streamline the notification process for vertical
agreements).
178. Commission Regulation 240/96, 1996 OJ. (L 31).
179. Commission Regulation 418/85, 1985 OJ. (L 53).
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(3) franchising agreements,8 0 (4) exclusive distribution agreements,' (5) exclusive
purchasing agreements,1'8 (6) specialization agreements, 8 3 (7) motor vehicle
distribution and servicing agreements,t18 and certain insurance related agreements.
Because any one joint venture or overall arrangement can include the elements of
many types of agreements, it is sometimes hard to predict its classification. High
technology benefits to a great degree from the first five block exemptions. An
agreement covered by a block exemption are subject to a lenient test to determine
its acceptability.
b. Individual Exemption
Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty states unequivocally four factors the
Commission must consider when deciding if an agreement qualifies for an
exemption: (1) "whether the agreements contributes to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress," (2)
"whether the consumers are allowed a fair share of the resulting benefits," (3)
"whether the restrictions in the agreement are indispensable to the attainment of the
objective," and (4) "whether the undertakings lack the potential to eliminate
competition."' 85 Each of these factors are discussed in that order.
i. Technological and Economic Progress
The exemption analysis involving technological and economic progress appears
to be the most accommodating to many of the high-technology companies. The
Commission views economic progress as flowing naturally from technological
progress. That is, where the former is found, the latter almost always seems to
follow.'86 Often, the Commission makes little or no reference to the economic
benefits, focusing instead on the technological progress. In both the Olivetti/Canon
and Eirpage cases, the Commission devoted only a few sentences to technological
progress analysis.
First, in Eirpage the Commission states that Eirpage's contribution to the
development of telecommunications services in Ireland is brought about by the
180. Commission Regulation 4087/88, 1988 OJ. (L 359).
181. Commission Regulation 1983/83, 1983 O.L (L 173).
182. Commission Regulation 1984/83, 1983 OJ. (L 173).
183. Commission Regulation 417/85, 1985 OJ. (L 53), amended by Commission Regulation 151/93, 1992
OJ. (L 21).
184. Commission Regulation 123/85, 1985 OJ. (L 15).
185. EEC TREATY, supra note 6, art. 85(3).
186. In Fujitsu, the Commission's analysis implied that technological progress is synonymous with
economic progress. The Commission stated that an "increasingly smaller, faster, more reliable, and more energy
efficient electronic system" would lead to technological and economic progress. See Fujitsu, supra note 136, at
point 41; see also Waller, supra note 47, at 711.
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quicker infusion of technology than would have occurred absent the agreement
between two "potential competitors"' 87 and the inclusion of rural areas into
Eirpage's geographic coverage. The economic benefits were said to come from the
stimulation of the paging equipment sector, the increased business efficiency, and
especially the ability of small and medium-sized businesses to expand
geographically.'
In Olivetti/Canon,189 the Commission cited the transfer of'technology to "a
Community undertaking" was "crucial" in these technology-driven markets.
Because Canon was known to be research-oriented, the Commission predicted that
this would continue to improve Europe's "technological patterns. 't 0
The very competitive copier, facsimile, and laser printer markets required
competitors to offer up-to-date products in order to compete efficiently. This joint
venture spread the cost of the investments, avoided duplication of development
costs, and stimulated research through the avoidance of duplication costs.19'
The Olivetti/Canon decision was consistent with the analysis in the Fujitsu
decision. Fujitsu involved computer-hardware in which the Commission combined
the technological and economic progress discussion with the benefits to the
consumer analysis. The Commission noted in Fujitsu that the production of a new
generation of semiconductor chip wafers-termed flash memory-will lead to the
development of increasingly better products that will have a wide variety of benefits
in the long run. 192
The Commission's leniency towards arrangements which improve Europe's
technological status is further illustrated in the X/Open Group decision. Even after
declaring that non-members would have no say in setting technological standards,
the Commission granted an exemption because the restrictions were necessary to
achieve the benefits of an open system.
TheAstra telecommunications case provides a contrasting view to the computer
cases mentioned above. The benefits touted were that a privately-owned satellite
providing television services were not only the first medium-powered satellite, but
it was to compete with Intelsat and Eutelstat satellites for television
transmissions.' 93 The Commission's decision focused not on the satellite
competition, but on the agreements reached regarding its operation. The
187. See Eirpage, supra note 115, at point 14.
188. Id. at point 15.
189. Commission Decision 88188, 1987 OJ. (L 52) (Olivetti/Canon).
190. Id. at point 54. In 1987, Olivetti and Canon requested negative clearance for their recently formedjoint
venture. Olivetti was an Italian corporation dealing in high-technology products including personal computers,
terminals, printers, telecommunications equipment, and copying machines. Canon was a Japanese corporation
dealing in copying machines, cameras and optical products, and business machines. The two companies formed
Olivetti-Canon Industriale SpA, ajoint venture incorporated in Italy.
191. Id.
192. See Fujitsu, supra note 136, at point 41.
193. See Astra, supra note 121, at point 19.
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Commission noted that SES did not need BT as a partner in order to acquire and
launch the satellite. The only reason that SES formed a partnership with BT was
because BT was the sole statutorily privileged up-link provider. The benefits of this
arrangement were said to be negligible.
Turning to the Commission's analysis of economic progress, it is concerned
with the rationalization and quick restructuring of an industry and the efficient use
of resources. 194 A constant theme is the idea that the agreements in question would
not only result in a more sophisticated product, but those products would be
commercialized quicker.95
The Commission's fear that European firms will lose their competitiveness
manifests itself in several Commission decisions. The Commission stated flatly in
Olivetti/Canon that the joint venture enables a transfer of the benefit of advanced
technology to Olivetti. Olivetti was a European company in markets where
technology is of "crucial importance" and where hopefully the "technological
patterns of the EEC industry" will be improved.196
For example, the Commission was in the midst of planning the deregulation of
the telecommunications industry' 97 when it decided the Optical Fibres case.'98 The
joint venture involved the development, production, and sale of optical fibers and
optical cables.' 99 The technology was viewed as breathing new life into the old
network by expanding the utility of telecommunications from simple voice
telephony into a multipurpose information systems network.20° The parties in this
case were neither actual or potential competitors; instead, they were companies with
complementary technologies. The Commission voiced concern over Corning's
presence in an oligopolistic market.20' The Commission commented that the
introduction of the up-to-date technology by Coming was "essential" to enable
European companies to withstand competition from the United States and Japan.2 2
194. See, e.g., Exxon/Shell, supra note 155, at point 67 (noting that thejoint venture would result in reduced
raw materials use, their cost, and the volume of plastic waste).
195. See, e.g., Optical Fibres, supra note 5 , at point 59; Commission Decision 97n780 ,.J. (L 318) at point
85 (Unisource); Commission Decision 941771, 1994 OJ. (L 309) at point 30 (Olivetti-Digital); Commission
Decision 96/547, 1996 OJ. (L 239) at point 61 (Phoenix/GlobalOne); Commission Decision 94/579, 1994 O.J.
(L 223) at point 53 (BT-MCI); Commission Decision 941770, 1994 O.J. (L 309) at point 83 (Pasteur
Merieux-Merck).
196. See Olivetti/Canon, supra note 189, at point 54.
197. The Commission was working on its Telecommunications Green Paper, which came out in 1987. The
telecommunications deregulation in Britain had made this concept more acceptable on the continent. Ungerer,
supra note 23, at 1119.
198. Optical Fibres, supra note 51, at point 30.
199. Id. at point 38.
200. See Ungerer, supra note 23, at 1119-20.
201. Optical Fibres, supra note 51, at point 38.
202. See id. at point 59; see also Margarida Afonso, A Catalogue of Merger Defenses Under European and
United StatesAntitrust Law, 33 HARv. INT'L LJ. 1, 26-27 ("Competition from firms located outside the common
market is portrayed either as a constraint on the exercise of domestic market power by Community producers, or
as warranting reinforcement of their market power to enable them to compete on the world markets.").
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The implication is that European companies would have little chance of keeping up
with technological developments by going it alone. Commentators have stated that
any subsequent parties defending a joint venture with this argument will be taken
seriously by the Commission. 203 More recently, the Commission has reiterated this
fear in the BT-MC12 4 and Phoenix/GlobalOne25 decisions-cases decided after the
aggressive liberalization of the telecommunications industry. They have even said
that reduction of overcapacity is tech progress.
206
ii. Consumer Benefits
Commentators have stated that it is not difficult to satisfy this condition under
Commission analysis. 207 The Commission sometimes views consumer benefits as
flowing directly from technology or economic gains observed from the first part of
Article 85(3) analysis2°--recall in Fujitsu that the Commission merged the two
analyses. Often the analysis seems like a formality,2°9 and sometimes reiterates the
same points brought up in the first part of the analysis.20 That is, the reasoning that
the Commission applied to affirming technological or economic progress, were
also, almost by definition, benefits to consumers. This is not just limited to product
price reductions, which is a concern appearing in many of the cases analysis. A
wide variety of effects can constitute a benefit. Examples include: the introduction
of new products and services on the market,11 conceivable new products are likely
203. See Alfonso, supra note 202, at 27. ("IMhe defense is likely to receive serious consideration under the
Regulation.").
204. BT-MCI, supra note 195, at point 53.
205. Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 57.
206. See Commission Decision 84/380, O.J. (L 207) at points 8-9, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 787 (Synthetic
Fibres).
207. John Temple Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community Law, Present and Future,
FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 25,34-5 (Barry Hawk ed., 1979). See generally 2 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES,
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE, ch. 9, 298-344 (Supp. 1992).
208. See, e.g., Commission Decision 85/560,1985 OJ. (L369) at point 15 (BPIKellogg); Fujitsu, supra note
136, at point 41 (merging the technological and economic progress analysis with the benefits to the consumer
analysis for a total of two sentences); Commission Decision 90/46, 1990 O.L. (L 32) at point 18 (Alcatel)
(merging the two analyses into a single sentence and assuming that the technological and economic progress was
the benefit).
209. See, e.g., Olivetti/Canon, supra note 189, at point 55 (analyzing consumer benefits in a single
sentence).
210. Pasteur Merieux-Merck, supra note 195, at points 83, 90.
211. See, e.g., Olivetti/Canon, supra note 189, at point 55; Unisource, supra note 195, at point 90; BT-MCI,
supra note 195, at point 55.
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to be more advanced than the old design, t2 citizens' health,213 cost savings for the
parties involved,2 t4 and stability in prices charged and quantities supplied.2 15
iii. Indispensability
The restriction on competition must not prove indispensable to thejoint venture
agreement. t6 There is speculation that the indispensable analysis is becoming
increasingly important.2 7 Generally, an agreement is indispensable when the
agreements entered into do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives
of the agreement .21 The concept is that the joint-venture agreements would never
have been entered into without these particular agreements. 9 The Commission is
especially wary of absolute territorial protection, restrictions on the customers to
be supplied, and resale price restrictions. °
The Astra decision provided a lengthy discussion on indispensability that
ultimately resulted in the Commission's rejecting the joint venture. The further the
restrictive agreement is to the main purpose of the agreement, the more likely it will
be deemed indispensable." The Commission noted that the agreements in question
were peripheral to the core of the joint venture.
Eirpage is a good illustration of how much the Commission will speculate as
to alternatives to present agreements. The Commission justified the indispensability
of the joint venture as the most rapid and effective way to propagate new paging
212. See Bayer/BP Chemical, supra note 45, Part 11.B ("[M]odem and gives superior performance....");
see also Enichem/ICI, supra note 45, art I.B (commenting that it was not even sure about quality, but they were
satisfied to speculate that it was "probably" better).
213. Pasteur Merieux-Merck, supra note 195, at point 89.
214. See, e.g., Commission Decision 87/3,1987 OJ. (L 5) at point 33 (ENI/Montedison). However, the EC
will consider who benefits from the cost savings, the firms or consumers. It helps if consumers are passed the
savings. It may lead the Commission to conclude that there is strong competition in the market. See, e.g.,
Commission Decision 83/669, 1983 OJ. (L 376) (Carbon Gas Technologie). The EC was satisfied that firms
would not keep cost savings when consumers had strong purchasing power. Optical Fibres, supra note 51, at point
79; see also HAWK, supra note 207, at 320-21.
215. Carbon Gas Technologie Oil, supra note 214, at point 17.
216. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 3-041 (declaring that this is a tough conceptual problem in
general).
217. See HAWK, supra note 207, at 138.
218. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, at 165-66 (stating that the least restrictive solution consistent with
achieving the aims of the agreement); see also Optical Fibres, supra note 51, at points 61-72.
219. See, e.g., Commission Decision 88/563,1988 OJ. (1309) at point 34 (Delta Chemie/DDD) (suggesting
that this reasoning rings hollow because it is hard to see how competition has been restricted); BELLAMY & CHILD,
supra note 28, at 165.
220. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, at 166 (adding that a general rule of thumb is that the more
restrictive an agreement is, the more likely it will be deemed not indispensable); see also Emmanuel P.
Mastromanolis, Insights From U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and Restricted Territorial Distribution: The
Creation of a New Legal Standard for European Union Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 559, 579
(noting that absolute territorial protection runs counter to the European goal of market integration).
221. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 3-043.
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technology.222 When addressing the concern that Telecom, the former national
carrier, could have provided this service by itself, the Commission reasoned that the
paging concept is "new and unknown," especially in the rural areas. This would
have resulted in slow acceptance by consumers. From this they concluded that
Telecom could have set up a paging system in the "Dublin area only.' 223 The
Commission then speculated that if Motorola were to enter the market alone, its
commercial nature would have led it to provide profitable paging service to the
cities, but not to the marginally profitable rural areas. The Commission remarked
negatively on a "post-term non-competition obligation" provision of the agreement,
which was subsequently deleted prior to the Commission's Decision.224
In GEC-ANT-Telettra-SAT2 decision, the Commission was faced with a joint
venture between four large companies in an already oligopolistic
telecommunications hardware market. 26 The parties agreed on two points. First,
any member wanting to establish a consortium within the context of a European
program (for example, ESPRIT and RACE) must first offer the other members a
right to participate. Second, any member wanting to develop a European network
of systems, equipment, or critical components must first offer the chance to
participate to at least one other member.227 The Commission quickly noted that
these commitments were "necessary to allow the partners to exchange technical
data and to create the necessary climate of confidentiality."22 The Commission's
opinion also suggests that because of the time it takes a high-technology product to
arrive at the market is crucial, the indispensability of agreements is more likely to
be found when time is critical for success. This argument was also used in the
computer hardware case Fujitsu. After stating that time is critical and research
investments are usually large in this sector, the Commission found that the joint
venture was the "most efficient" way to bring new high-technology products to the
market.2 9
In the telecommunications hardware case of Optical Fibres, the Commission
identified the benefits as the availability of an advanced product, the rapid transfer
of this technology to European companies, and a greater number of suppliers for
Europe's telecom operators.20 Without explanation, the Commission said a partial
222. Eirpage, supra note 115, at point 18.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Id. at point 19.
225. 1988 OJ. (C 180) (GEC-ANT-Telettra-SAT).
226. The "technical area of cooperation" imagined was transmission systems, equipment and technology
for cable transmission, microwave transmission, earth stations, multiplex, broad band video transmission and
integrated services digital network. Id. at point 5.
227. Id. at point 8.
228. Id. at point 12(c).
229. Fujitsu, supra note 136, at point 42 (adding that the scope of cooperation was the minimum amount
needed to bring about the benefits).
230. Optical Fibres, supra note 51, at point 60.
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divestiture by Coming would "destroy" the benefits identified, and would increase
the risk of European companies becoming "uncompetitive on the EEC and world
markets."23' Here, the Commission is clearly focused on the benefits to companies
as opposed to individual consumers. The three alternatives to this joint venture
available to Coming were the following: (1) marketing optical fibers in Europe that
have been imported from the U.S., (2) establishing a plant in Europe, or (3) granting
licenses.z2 Reiterating their concern for businesses and competitiveness, the
Commission dismissed the first two alternative options for the sole reason that they
would provide no technology transfer to European companies. The third option
would not "facilitate the efficient flow of technology" as well as the joint venture.
In order to pass the indispensability test, the joint venture agreements were
modified to reduce Coming's voting rights in the German joint venture, remove
Coming's board representation in the German joint venture, and a decrease in
Coming's board representation in the United Kingdom partnership. The
Commission also allowed the agreement to require unanimous approval for a
limited number of matters because it believed the parties would not have cooperated
without such veto rights. 3 The exclusive sales licences were taken out of the
agreement because the optical fiber market was highly oligopolistic, there exists no
intermediate fiber optics trade, and the major purchasers of the product favored
local suppliers.234
The Commission treated the limited membership agreement in X/Open Group
with surprising brevity. The Commission found that regardless of the fact that some
members were direct competitors, the ability to decide which outside companies
may participate in a massive standard setting venture was practical. If any company
could join and participate, there would be "practical and logistical difficulties"
which might "possibly prevent appropriate proposals being passed."'235 This opinion
is somewhat confusing because the admitted collusion between many large
corporations to set a standard in an increasingly important industry is balanced only
against a convenience argument-and the convenience argument prevails. That is,
the Commission maintained that the identified benefits-wider choice of
application programs and consumer savings-would only be brought about by the
Group's ability to exclude members. The Commission did not adequately explain
why the benefits sought would only come about with this level of trade distortion.
It also did not state how more members would render the group unmanageable.
231. Id. at point 61.
232. See id. at point 62.
233. Id at point 66.
234. Id. at point 67.
235. X/Open Group, supra note 167, at point 45 (emphasis added) ("The practical difficulties of bringing
together representatives of the members with authority to commit their companies without endless discussions
increase considerably with the number of members.").
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iv. Elimination of Competition
The Commission attempts to foster sufficient competition among competing
products in the market and to insure that joint ventures will not foreclose entry of
236new products and businesses. When analyzing whether an agreement eliminates
competition, the Commission considers two factors: the relevant product market
and the relevant geographic market.23 7 For example, in Eirpage the Commission
noted that competition existed. Nothing was preventing entry into the market,
paging was being influenced by developments in the mobile telephone market and
Personal Communication Networks technologies, and Eirpage's efforts were to
develop the paging market in general and not just for itself.238
C. Summary
The Commission has not changed the structural analysis of high-technology
ventures as compared to the traditional framework. Only recently has the
Commission starting to get the ball moving towards a procedural restructuring of
Article 85 analysis.239 Immediate change is mostly directed at the substantive policy
justifications and resulting analysis of high-technology joint ventures.
The Commission's high-technology analysis occasionally shows the difficulties
the Commission has with these markets. The analysis of whether the arrangements
between parties are agreements is just as abrupt and conclusory as the analyses in
older high-technology cases.240 The restriction-on-competition element of Article
85(1) is generally the focus of both old and new cases.
Joint ventures involving telecommunications services are treated similarly with
joint ventures involving computer or information technology. Most notable is the
Commission's preference not to force a narrow product market definition upon
high-technology services. The cases involving telecommunications services cases
were the biggest beneficiaries of the Commissions unwillingness to narrowly define
these markets. Cases involving non-service products-such as hardware- resulted
in an even narrower product market being drawn. One important aspect of the high
tech market that the Commission is concerned with is the quick dissemination of
technology to European markets. This was a consistent theme in the analyses.24
236. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 28, § 3-044.
237. See id. §3-045.
238. See Eirpage, supra note 115, at point 20.
239. See generally Delors White Paper, supra note 67.
240. See, e.g., Commission Decision 76/172, 1997 OJ. (L 30) (Bayer/Gist-Brocades); Commission
Decision 80/1332, 1980 OJ. (L 383) pt. II (Vacuum Interrupters) (presuming the transaction is an agreement).
241. See Lang, supra note 120, at 758.
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With regard to the acceptability of non-competition agreements, the
Commission's past decisions have been mixed. In the 1983 Carbon Gas
Technologie decision, the Commission validated a post-participation, non-
competition agreement lasting five years after any party left the joint venture. 2
This case involved a joint venture between several companies involved in the field
of coal gasification. The Commission stated that the agreement was indispensable
because "the assumption must be that complete concentration of [the parents']
efforts on the attainment of the objective of the cooperation can be ensured only if
any attempt to achieve an individual competitive edge is ruled out. ' 4 3 They
continued, "It affords a limited degree of protection against competition from a
former shareholder or from 21 outside companies, without which the object of the
cooperation cannot be attained." Compare this treatment with Eirpage, a more
modem case. Recall that the Commission required the non-competition agreement
to be stricken from the original agreements in order for them to receive an
exemption.
The Commission defines product markets very narrowly in the biotech,
pharmaceutical, and chemical fields. This is not surprising given that medicines are
typically disease-specific. As the Commission in Pasteur Merieux-Merck pointed
out, "each vaccine ensuring immunity against a specific disease forms a different
product market. From the viewpoint of the consumer, no substitutability exists
between vaccines protecting against different diseases."2 4
IV. EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S ANALYSIS OF HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
A. Definition, Characteristics, and Corporate JustificationsforStrategic Alliances
Increasing amounts of literature seem to be devoted to describing or analyzing
the relatively new strategic alliance concept of corporate partnering.24 5 Much of the
literature praises strategic alliances2" and others call it an outright necessity.247
Strategic alliances are essentially a type of corporate partnering24 8 meant to utilize
242. See, e.g., Carbon Gas Technologie, supra note 214, at point B(3).
243. Id.
244. Pasteur Merfieux-Merck, supra note 195, at point 53. The Commission narrowed the market further
stating that multivalent vaccines belong to a different product market than the equivalent monovalent vaccines.
This was because "the consumer/prescriber adopts relatively quickly a distinct usage whereby the multivalent is
preferred for general immunization whereas the monovalents are mainly used for either brush-up immunization
or as a booster for non-protected persons." Id. at point 54.
245. See discussion infra note 264 and accompanying text.
246. See Gaynor N. Kelley, The Age of Strategic Partnerships, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Jan 1, 1994.
247. See John T. Sakai, Japan as an Attractive Alliance Partner, DIREcTORS & BOARDS, Jan. 1, 1994. See
generally Harvey Meyer, My Enemy, My Friend, J. BUS. STRATEGY, Sept. 19, 1998.
248. See ALAN S. GUTrERMAN, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1
(1995).
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the complementary assets of another firm.249 This partnering can take several
forms250 encompassing any or all of the following: technology licensing
arrangements, research and development agreements, manufacturing relationships,
sales and distribution agreements, joint ventures, and other various agreements."
There has been a surge of alliances in the last 15 years, with the bulk of them
occurring in Western Europe.25 2 The early 1990s showed a 25% increase in cross-
border alliances253 while a 1992 survey of electronics industry CEOs noted that
"eight out of every ten electronics companies now have alliances." ' The mixture
of characteristics that define an alliance can sometimes lead to its mistaken
characterization as ajoint venture.255 The Commission distinguishes them in name,
and to some degree in content. 6 However this section explores whether the
Commission distinguishes them analytically.
Alliances have been defined as "[a] particular mode of inter-organizational
relationship in which the partners make substantial investments in developing a
long-term collaborative effort and common orientation. 'z 7 This definition may
seem to define any traditional collaboration between companies, however the
249. See id. at 1-2.
250. See id. at 2-3 (illustrating a number of commonly structured partnering relationships).
251. Id. at 11-18; see also William J. Kolasky, Jr., Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines For Strategic
Alliances, 1063 PLI/Corp 499 (1998), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL library. One commentator categorized
strategic alliances based on the probable outcomes: collisions between competitors, alliances of the weak,
disguised sales, bootstrap alliances, evolutions to a sale, and alliances of complementary equals; Joel Bleeke, Is
Your Strategic Alliance Really a Sale?, HARv. Bus. R., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 97; Rosabeth Moss Kanter,
Collaborative Advantage, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1994, at 571. For a thorough examination on how to form,.
organize, and operate a joint venture or alliance, see ROBERT P. LYNCH, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO JOINT
VENTURES & CORPORATE ALLIANCES (1989).
252. DAVID FAULKNER, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: CO-OPERATING TO COMPETE 1 (1995).
253. See Bleeke, supra note 251, at 97.
254. See Kolasky, supra note 251, at 501. IBM is reported to have more than 10,000 alliances. Id. Sun
Microsystems, Inc. President Scott McNealy claims that Sun has more than 3,500 strategic alliances with software
vendors; see also Scott McNealy, A Winning Business Modelfor the '90s, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Sept. 22, 1995.
For a survey on strategic alliances within Canadian industries, see <http'//www.info.ic.gc.catcmb/
welcomeic.nsf/Pages.html.
255. The similar characteristics have lead some to call the two "virtually synonymous" when defining ajoint
venture broadly to include any collaborative agreement. Kolasky, supra note 251, at 505. Business professionals
and some U.S. courts view joint ventures more narrowly to mean an agreement that creates a new legal entity.
256. The Commission delineates between "alliance" and "joint ventures" in documents including their
recent annual Competition policy Reports. However they do not provide a clear definition of an alliance. Their
use of the term alliance is often mentioned alongside global partnering agreements or large international ventures.
A bias favoring alliances that are global in nature may have been implied in their statement that "the acceptability
of alliances, which are often pro-competitive outside domestic markets, must be assessed in light of the extent to
which those markets have been liberalized." XXVI Report, supra note 76, at point 66.
257. See DAVID FAULKNER, supra note 252; see also RANDALL L. CARLSON, THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY: STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MULTIMEDIA 117 (1996) (defining a
strategic relationship as "an inter-corporate relationship that spans vertically or horizontally between two or more
firms. Organizationally, it is a joint venture, product swap, licensing arrangement, or strategic alliance. Mergers
and acquisitions do not generally count as alliances").
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strategic alliance embodies a distinct style of collaboration with a unique set of
goals.
A company seeking an immediate massive gain in market share, innovation,
or new markets has historically used mergers to do so. The less drastic options were
joint ventures or a wide array of collaborative agreements including distribution and
technology swapping contracts. The strategic alliance is the new collaborative
model for high technology because it offers the partners something that joint
ventures and the traditional-style contract agreements do not offer: flexibility and
greater potential for gains in innovation, profit, and growth.
Joint ventures can be characterized as a collaborative effort in the form of a
legal entity, i.e., a corporation. These entities are narrowly focused with its
direction and mission cemented in place. One of the partners usually ends up
operating the joint venture, which essentially means running the operation almost
in toto. The results are minimal enterprising, collaboration, and learning.28
Strategic alliances are much more flexible because the partnership does not
necessarily anchor itself to any one direction, mission, technology, or partner.259 It
offers greater independence for the partners,2'6 but this results in greater ambiguity
and uncertainty regarding specific goals. However, the alliance is typically based
on an agreement to adapt and change with the consumer market, thus the evolution
of the partners relationship is inherently unpredictable.26' This collaborative
strategy makes it seemingly riskier than joint ventures and contractual agreements.
Regardless of the risk, the alliance is proving to be popular for a variety of
reasons. It is thought that an alliance can create greater value in a shorter time than
the traditional joint venture or agreement. The value can be in the form of
innovation and creativity, profits, growth, or any other benefit to the partners. For
example, an alliance may create more opportunities or options for the partners than
a joint venture because of the alliance's inherent flexibility and the rigid nature of
a joint venture.262 This can be construed as value even if it cannot be measured
easily.263 As will be discussed later, this poses a potential problem to antitrust
258. See generally DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 2 (adding that joint ventures are relatively safe because the
risks are known).
259. See Kenichi Ohmae, The Global Logic of Stratgic Alliances, HARV. Bus. R., MarJApr, LEXJS, at 11
(1989) (analogizing to marriage he states that there is a large measure of trust that is needed to make the
relationship flourish).
260. GUr7MRMAN, supra note 248, at 6.
261. Id.
262. See Doz & HAMMEL, supra note 2, at 15, 19.
263. Id. at 11. The authorgoes on to note that "[v]alue creation in traditional joint ventures, and in customer-
supplier partnerships, is usually easy to measure." Id. Furthermore, the author adds that value is measurable in
mature industries and typical R&D agreements. Id. at 11; see also Mody, supra note 15, at 165 (asserting that as
an alliance network grows, so does the value of an alliance to each individual participant); MrrcHELL L. MARKS
& PHILLP H. MIRVIS, JOINING FORCEs 5, 14 (1998) (suggesting that maximizing value will not come about
through economies of scale and elimination of redundancy); Doz & HAMMEL, supra note 2, at 9-11, 39-56
(describing the concept of value creation and arguing that the present economic analysis needs to take into account
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authorities when they measure the costs and benefits of an agreement, and it may
require consideration when scrutinizing the acceptability of an alliance.264
The role that strategic alliance formation plays in the high-technology industry
is increasingly one of necessity. Statistics show a disparate use by high technology
of this strategy as compared to other industries. A recent survey shows that seventy-
four percent of the fastest growing high-technology companies utilized strategic
alliances in 1996, as compared with forty-nine percent of the fastest growing
companies in other industries. 265 It is not hard to imagine that the numbers will
continue to increase for most industries. The disproportionate use of alliances in
high tech occurs for several reasons. First, the high-technology industry grapples
with rapid evolution of technology, whereas other industries do not.2"s To stay
competitive, a company must incorporate into its business plan a flexible operating
structure. If a company is tied down to a contract, joint venture, or product line that
becomes irrelevant to current consumer preferences, the company will fall behind
nimbler competitors. This result can be fatal to a slow reacting company.2 67
Strategic alliances offer the flexibility that a fast product cycle industry like high
technology requires. Second, high-technology industries are also a model of
industry and technology convergence-for example, cellular and terrestrial
telephony, paging, video-conferencing, facsimile services, Internet commerce, and
mass media.268 Many if not all of these high-technology industries, especially
information technology, electronics, Internet-related industries, media, and
telephony, are integrating more and more already available technology into existing
products, or modified versions. It was not too long ago when cell phones did not
have paging and Internet interfacing technology incorporated into them. The third
reason for high-technology's preference for alliances is that competition in the high
technology arena is particularly aggressive and will only increase as nation states'
trade barriers collapse. The rate of alliance formation within high-technology
industries is an example of the vigorous competition, and sometimes desperate,
need to survive. Companies must form a web of alliances with different industries
the more abstract notions of value).
264. See discussion infra notes 279-93 and accompanying text.
265. Coopers Lybrand-Trendsetter Barometer, July 31, 1997 <http://www2us.coopers.comeas/trendset/
161.html>.
266. For example, the semiconductor industry has a cycle time of 5 years or less, whereas the slow-moving
technology of shipbuilding has a cycle time of 15 years. The New Innovators: Global Patenting Trends in Five
Sectors, U.S. Office of Technology, p. 38 (1998), available at <http://www.ota.nap.edu.html>.
267. See Jack Schofield, A Megabyte out of the Market Despite IBM's Decline, the Computer Industry
Enjoyed a Boom Last Year, Guardian, Feb. 18, 1993, available at 1993 WL 9898120 (describing IBM's huge
losses in the personal computer market in the early 1990s).
268. See DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 2, at 14. Other particular industries also face this convergence. For
example: banking, insurance, mutual funds, financial planning, credit cards; see also Tom Brown, Strategic
Alliances Are Hot-And Getting Hotter, Leader Lines, available at <http://www.mgeneral.comll-lines/99-
lines/0217991i.html> "Where does one industry end and the next one begin." Id.
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focusing on different technology in the hope that they can collaboratively produce
a product desired by the consuming public before competing alliances do.
Generally, firms form an alliance because of the perceived need to cooperate
in order to stay competitive in the technological and increasingly global markets.269
Finns also form alliances because the rising costs of competing globally prevent
them from going it alone.270 This increasing need for cooperation is driven by
several factors. First, greater globalization in industry requires cooperation with
entrenched or native firms to overcome the cost and regulatory obstacles.271 Second,
technological advances are increasing the optimal-sized firm's economies of scale
and scope.272 Third, globalization pressures a large firm to specialize in its core
competencies and to form alliances for non-core competencies. 273 Fourth, with the
increased complexity of technology, few if any firms can champion them all. 274
Firms try to find other companies that specialize in the particular technology
needed. 275 Fifth, the quick pace of technological change allows companies in
alliances enough flexibility to change with itY 6 Sixth, the technology market
rewards the quickest firm the greatest advantage in establishing the industry
standard.277
The need to cooperate is not without its skeptics and attendant risks. This
changing environment has thrown together what antitrust authorities suspect as
unholy alliances between competitors or potential competitors. Competitors often
form alliances not necessarily to merge products or apportion the markets, but to
help develop the market for the products collectively.278 Thus, alliances that appear
facially anti-competitive are in many instances beneficial to consumers.279 The
market forces which drive competing firms to collaborate are arguably on a
collision course with the goals of EC competition policy.
269. See Kolasky, supra note 251, at 502.
270. Gary Hamel, Collaborate With Your Competitors, HARV. Bus. REV. Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 2; see also
GUTrERMAN, supra note 248, at 553.
271. See Kolasky, supra note 251, at 502.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See generally GuTrERMAN, supra note 248.
276. John W. Slocum, The New Learning Strategy: Anytime, Anything, Anywhere, Org. Dynamics, vol. 23
no. 2, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2820028 (stating that vertical integration can harm a company because it
insulates the organization for market changes).
277. Cf Mark A. Lemely, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CON. L. REV. 1041
(1996).
278. See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER &BARRYJ.NALEBuFF, Co-oPErmON 32(1996) (giving an example
of how electronic publishing, once seen as a threat by traditional publishers, has actually increased the overall
demand for printed versions of books).
279. See Christopher Boam, Giving the Phoenix Wings: The Deutsche Telekom/France Telecom/Sprint
Alliance, 5 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 73, 82 (1997) (noting that global companies desire one firm to service all
their telecom needs in order to streamline communication and cut costs, and this has lead to a wave of
telecommunication alliances).
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B. European Commission Decisions Involving Strategic Alliances
To date the Commission has decided relatively few cases that involved
strategic alliances, and most have been decided in the last five years. The relevant
cases include: Phoenix/GlobalOne,280 BT-MCI, Olivetti-Digital, Unisource, and
Atlas.281 Four of the cases involve international telecommunication services, while
Olivetti-Digital deals with computer hardware technology. The Commission
applied an Article 85 analysis, and these cases provided the Commission with an
opportunity to treat alliances differently than joint ventures. What follows is a
discussion of the Commission Article 85(1) and 85(3) concerns and a brief
summary discussing common themes found in the alliance cases.
1. Computer Case
a. Olivetti-Digital
The alliance between Olivetti, an Italian corporation, and Digital, an American
corporation, involved Digital's new generation of reduced instruction set computer
(RISC) architecture, called Alpha AXP. Olivetti contracted to incorporate Alpha
AXP into its computers.
The Commission construed the "Strategic Alliance Agreement" as seven
agreements between parties. It should be noted that the Commission did not label
the companies' relationship between themselves as an alliance on its own. Out of
the seven provisions, six received negative clearance and only one fell within
Article 85(1) scrutiny. Before applying Article 85(1) scrutiny the Commission dealt
with the product and geographic market.
The Commission identified two relevant product markets: the market for RISC
technology including microprocessors, other hardware, software, and know how
and the market for various computer system end products that incorporate RISC
technology.2s2 The Commission dismissed the geographic market concerns in one
sentence. Worldwide trade, the small importance of transaction costs, and the
relatively insignificant trade barriers led the Commission to conclude that the
relevant geographic market was the world.23 This conclusion may soon be the de
facto conclusion considering the global presence and market penetration of many
high-technology businesses. This benefits companies because a wide market base
will diffuse a company's market share and any perceived anti-competitive behavior.
280. It should be noted that Phoenix later changed its name to GlobalOne. For a detailed description of the
background and entire deal, see generally Boam, supra note 279.
281. Commission Decision 961546, 1996 OJ. (L239) (Atlas).
282. See Olivetti-Digital, supra note 195, at point 8.
283. Id. at point 10.
1999/High-Tech Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
i. Article 85(1) Analysis
The first provision the Commission examined was the purchase commitment
by Olivetti to the Alpha AXP technology. This was not within Article 85(1)
purview even after the Commission decided that the agreement restricted Olivetti's
freedom to choose its technology.284 The Commission did not equate the purchase
commitment to a restriction of competition for two reasons. First, Olivetti would
not sink the finances into developing the RISC technology independently, so there
would not actually be any stifling of independent development.285 The Commission
qualified their analysis by stating that the market was headed towards a preference
for this technology, and Olivetti "needs" this technology to maintain its position as
a "leading European supplier.' '2 6 The incorporation of the "competitive edge"
argument seems ill-placed and more suited for rationalizing an Article 85(3)
exemption as the Commission occasionally does.8 7 Second, the Commission stated
that considering the resource expenditure to maintain one line of RISC computers
and the inertia inherent in quickly changing to another RISC technology, Olivetti
would simply not purchase another one.28 8 The restriction on competition was not
absent, it merely was not "beyond what is inherent in any choice of a specific RISC
platform."' 9 The Commission may have felt that the restriction on competition
between two large companies was sufficiently minimized by the fact that it was
only a five-year commitment.
The second agreement examined involved the purchasing commitment by
Olivetti to buy US$80 million of Digital's Alpha AXP technology based
products.2" The purchasing agreement was found to fall within Article 85(1)
purview. The violation was due to the restriction on the "freedom to choose its
supplier."29' A commitment to purchase Alpha AXP technology was considered a
non-appreciable restriction on Olivetti's ability to freely choose, but a commitment
to purchase a given amount of the products was an appreciable restriction. The
Commission saw the apparent unequal treatment between its analysis between the
two provisions, and it stated that a distinction must be drawn. They posited that
since Digital had licensed the technology to several companies, Olivetti could
purchase it from several others besides Digital.292 The distinction is valid to the
extent that a commitment to one technology does preclude choice to a certain
degree. However, technology's rapid advancement should have forced the
284. Id. at point 20.
285. See id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at point 21.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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Commission to speculate as to the necessity of a five year commitment by Olivetti.
Their justification for Olivetti's commitment to technology was that "RISC-based
central processing units [were] expected to increase substantially in the coming
years. 293
The third provision examined was the "residual purchasing commitment."
294
Olivetti agreed to purchase US$70 million worth of Digital equipment within two
years time. The Commission concluded that this provision was not within Article
85(1) scrutiny. The agreement was not related to Digital's supply agreement
involving AXP products because it was not meant to reinforce Digital's position or
weaken Olivetti's position in a particular market segment. 5 Therefore, the
purchase agreement was a separate supply contract, and as such, it was limited to
two years and did not significantly overshadow its other purchase agreements with
Digital's competitors. The agreement did not have as its "object or effect an
appreciable restriction of competition. 296
The fourth provision was a "very general" agreement between the parties to
examine the possibility of further cooperation and agreements not covered by the
present notification.297 The Commission said the following about this agreement:
"this decision should not, therefore, prejudice the view which the Commission may
take of such future agreements, if any."298 The decision not to rule on the "future
cooperation" agreement suggested that the Commission may analyze future
agreements as they arise. This agreement embodies what business practitioners
view as a critical element that distinguishes a strategic alliance: the expressed will
to maintain flexibility. This has been the only high-technology alliance case that has
recognized and spoken on an agreement such as this.
The Commission determined that a services agreement was ancillary to the
purchasing commitments. 299 Little light was shed on the services agreements. The
agreement called for each party to provide their service expertise to the other side
regarding the transferred technology. The Commission found Article 85(1)
inapplicable because the agreement only involved services for their products that
each transferred to the other.
The parties also agreed to form four committees "aimed at facilitating the
implementation of the agreement." 300 The parties attested that the committees were
independent of Olivetti's board of directors, and within them, "all decisions are
negotiated and made by consensus.,,30 ' The complete independence of the
293. Id. at point 20.
294. Id. at point 22.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at point 23.
298. Id.
299. Id. at point 24.
300. Id. at point 12(e).
301. Id. at point 25.
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committees and the consensus requirement regarding all committee decisions led
the Commission to decide that "in these circumstances," the setting up of
committees did not fall within Article 85(1) scrutiny.302 The Commission stated that
they viewed the committees as structures not likely to be used for "commercial
cooperation" or "coordination of competitive behaviour," but instead was a vehicle
for technical cooperation.03
The "Share Purchase Agreement" and the "Shareholders' Agreement" were the
last two provisions that the Commission analyzed. Under the Share Purchase
Agreement, Digital was to buy eight percent of Olivetti's share capital. Under the
Shareholders' Agreement, Digital was given proportionate representation on
Olivetti's board of directors as long as it held twenty-five million shares of
Olivetti's common stock. The Commission concluded that Article 85(1) scrutiny
was inapplicable because both agreements did not have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition. As to the Share Purchase
Agreement, the Commission focused on whether there would be the threat of a
change in control in Olivetti. The Commission did not think so because the
agreement itself elaborated several restrictions on Digital meant to prevent it from
increasing its control over Olivetti. Digital was not allowed to purchase any interest
in Olivetti that would give them more than a ten percent stake in Olivetti. Digital
was prohibited from entering into voting agreements with third parties with respect
to Olivetti shares, and Digital was not given veto power that would have given it
controlling power over Olivetti.3'" The Shareholders' Agreement was outside of
Article 85(1) for the following reasons: (1) the board's role was only a supervisory
one that met four times a year, (2) the board members were outsiders and none had
an operational function at Olivetti, (3) the board played no part in the present
agreement with Digital and that the board was not even notified until after the deal
was concluded, and (4) the board played no part in product development or
305pricing.
ii. Article 85(3) Analysis
The Commission preceded its swift Article 85(3) analysis of the purchasing
commitment agreement with praise regarding the alliance as a whole. It noted that
the result would be an additional competitor in the RISC computer market. The
Commission emphasized that this would have been "impossible" without an
alliance of this sort. 6 Their choice of strong language is interesting and now
typical in the high-technology cases. It is certainly possible that with enough
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at point 26(a).
305. Id. at point 26(b).
306. Id. at point 28. Recall that they also mentioned this exact point earlier in the analysis at point 20.
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resources, any company can diversify and enter new markets. A more accurate
conclusion is that it may have been very unlikely that Olivetti would have done just
that. But, with a strong conclusion like theirs, the analytical road is a little smoother
and a European-based competitor is a little more competitive.
The Commission's Article 85(3) analysis was more conclusory than analytical.
The technical and economic benefit examination was a two sentence articulation 6f
what seemed to them as obvious outcomes. That is, Digital will be motivated to
commit itself to large-scale production of its technology and to disseminate it more
quickly.37 The increased availability of Alpha AXP filled computers will result in
increased production of software designed for it. The Commission concluded that
this promotes technical progress.
The Commission's concerns with regards to consumer benefits derived from
the agreement is similar to its concerns regarding technological and economic
progress. Greater production and a resulting decline in costs and prices was
anticipated. They stated that consumers will benefit from innovative products of
high quality that will fall in price as the RISC technology market matures.0 8
With regards to indispensability, the Commission only stated that the
commitment to purchase the products ensures that the benefits to the consumer will
be realized.309 There was no speculation as to less restrictive alternatives, but only
the implication that the amounts involved in this agreement was not restrictive
enough to invite a discussion about options.
Although the agreement reduces the number of Alpha AXP suppliers Olivetti
can use, no substantial elimination of competition was seen to occur because there
were "many manufacturers" that might want Alpha AXP products. There were also
a number of RISC-based computers on the market, so no real threat to competition
in the computer market was identified.10
2. Telecommunications Cases
a. BT-MCI
British Telecommunications (BT) and MCI Communications Corporation
(MCI) notified the Commission about agreements involving an equity buy-in and
the creation of a joint venture. BT is the former U.K monopolist
telecommunications operator that supplies telephone exchange lines; local, trunk,
and international telephone calls; other telecommunications services to consumers.
In 1994, it was the world's fourth largest telecommunications company in terms of
307. Id. at point 30.
308. Id. at point 31.
309. Id. at point 32.
310. Id. at point 33.
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traffic. 3 1' MCI is a United States telecommunications company that provides voice
and data communications, record communications and electronic mail to and from
the United States. As of 1994, it was the fifth largest telecommunications company
in the world in terms of traffic.1
The Commission parsed their analysis into three segments: (1) BT's investment
in MCI, (2) the creation of the joint venture, called Newco, and (3) a number of
contractual agreements." The Commission appeared to label this formation of a
partnership a strategic alliance on its own. Before reaching their Article 85(1)
analysis, the Commission extensively analyzed the product and geographic markets
and the actual and potential competitor aspects of the companies, and the many
agreements between companies.
The product market was defined as:
value-added and enhanced services to large multinational corporations,
extended enterprises and other intensive users of telecommunications
services provided over international intelligent networks. This market will
cover a wide range of existing global trans-border services, including
virtual network services, high-speed data services and outsourced global
telecommunications solutions specifically designed forindividual customer
requirements.3 3
The Commission identified six categories of services within this market: data
services, value-added application services, traveler services, intelligent network
services, integrated VSAT network services, and global outsourcing that allows
Newco to integrate the customer's third-party products and services already owned
by customers.31 4 The Commission emphasized that two important characteristics of
this product market were its global nature3 5 and a specific set of service
requirements. 6 The Commission noted the difficulty of defining the market
because it changes rapidly. The geographic market was considered global because
the telecommunications services created by alliances will be offered in a market
311. See BT-MCI, supra note 195, at point 3.
312. See id. at point 4.
313. See Id. at point 5.
314. See id. at point 6.
315. The Commission's list of characteristics that define the global nature of the product include: (1) the
provision of ubiquitous services across multiple borders, (2) the provision of consistent service levels and flexible
delivery schedules, (3) the irrelevancy of time-zones, languages, and currencies, (4) overcoming inadequacies of
local infrastructures, and (5) making customers believe service is local. (emphasis added). Id.
316. These requirements include: (1) single point of contact accountable for assuring service levels, (2)
seamless, uniform, flexible features/functionality across geography, (3) end-to-end provisioning, installation, fault
management, and service support, (4) reliable service, (5) customized billing, management information, reporting
with language and currency flexibility, (6) speed and ease of implementation, and (7) products that meet existing
and evolving needs. Id. at point 7.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 12
that will soon be unable to recognize national boundaries. However, those
boundaries were not yet extinct and the services were directed at a set of consumers
identified as international in nature. 17
Trade secrecy protection prevented the Commission from revealing most of the
market share information of Newco and its parent, so an analysis is not possible. In
the discussion regarding the many competitors of Newco, the Commission noted
that "the precise set of services being offered [by them] is never exactly the
same."3 8 The test of whether a company is a competitor is the nature of the product.
The Commission's comment about the lack of exactness between competing
products may be an afterthought, or it may seem to suggest that the Commission
may draw very narrow product market definitions. However, they did not do so in
this case.
i. Article 85(1) Analysis
The Commission started with an extensive analysis of the issue regarding
whether the two parent companies are actual or potential competitors with Newco
in the two markets they identified. 319 They concluded that the "parent companies
must be considered potential competitors of Newco and of each other in respect of
the global products to be offered by Newco and actual competitors in the overall
telecommunications market."' 20 The Commission recognized the ambiguity of
Newco's mission by next adding that the business scope is inherently evolving in
nature, and as such, its future evolution might affect whether it is a potential or
actual competitor of its parent companies.321
The Commission decided that the parties were potential competitors in the
international value-added and enhanced services market for a number of reasons.
Even though the parent companies were actual competitors before the creation of
Newco, the parties agreed to withdraw from this market and to let Newco service
it instead. Newco received a license from the parent companies to use the
technologies, while the parent companies retained ownership and their respective
R&D capabilities. 322 Newco will not engage in independent R&D, but will instead
grant contracts to its parent companies to engage in the necessary R&D. The
Commission concluded that this arrangement would maintain and enhance the
parents technological proficiency and know-how. In effect, the parents were not
ceding total ownership and use to Newco, but instead provided an arrangement that
317. See id. at point 15. The consumer segments identified were MNCs, extended enterprises, and other
intensive users of telecommunications. Id. at point 18.
318. See id. at point 17 (emphasis added).
319. Id. at points 34-42.
320. Id. at point 34.
321. Id.
322. See id. at point 37.
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made it possible, a "certainty" as the Commission declared, for the parents to stay
abreast of technological developments so that they might one day re-enter the
market. The parent companies could re-enter the market because they intended to
offer international customer services that were very similar to Newco's offerings.
The parent companies could offer local services and international services under
license from Newco-versus Newco's ability to only offer international
services-and the result might be that the business community would be motivated
by convenience or cost to buy the bigger package offered by the parents.
In concluding that the parent companies and Newco were actual competitors
with regards to telecommunications services, the Commission merely outlined the
relevant services that each parent provided in order to illustrate the web of alliances
and overlapping areas of business. There was little need for analysis because the
actual competition between the two parties was quite obvious. After establishing
that the parties were actual competitors, it was necessary for the Commission to
examine whether the agreements were within Article 85(1) scrutiny.
The Commission outlined several reasons why the creation of Newco fell
within Article 85(1) analysis. The Commission did not bother to discuss whether
this was an agreement between undertakings, probably because due to the
obviousness of that fact. It makes sense that the Commission did give some
attention to whether this would restrict competition, because this hurdle
increasingly appears to be the key to Article 85(1) analysis of high-technology joint
strategic alliances. Whereas the first two hurdles are often cut and dry issues, the
restriction of competition issue is more abstract and often times demands
explanation because it is central to competition law.324 Because the creation of
Newco involved exclusive licensing agreements, the Commission concluded that
it fell under Article 85(1) prohibition. It was not convinced that the creation of
Newco was the "only objective means" for the parent companies to move into and
remain in the market for international and enhanced value-added services .325 After
all, both parent companies had "substantial" activities in similar fields and the
financial and technological capacities to enter the market on their own.3 26 The
Commission added that the creation of Newco would result in the parent company's
cessation of developing similar products on its own. As stated earlier, the possible
reduction in the aggregate amount of R&D resulting from an agreement is typically
a red flag for the Commission.
As to whether BT's investment in MCI was within Article 85(1) prohibition,
the Commission concluded that it was not. In a relatively short analysis, the
Commission stated that normally the purchase of one company's shares does not
fall within Article 85(1). However, it might be within Article 85(1) if the buy-in
323. See id. at point 38.
324. See DOWNING, supra note 16, at 34.
325. See BT-MCI, supra note 195, at point 43.
326. Id.
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was accompanied with other agreements that resulted in the coordination or
influence of competitive behavior of the parties.327 The Commission briefly
mentioned additional agreements regarding BT's representation on MCI's board of
directors. The Commission noted that there were agreements made that restricted
BT's increase in shareholdings for 10 years and prevented BT from seeking control
or influence over the company.32
ii. Article 85(3) Analysis
The Commission outlined four improvements the alliance would contribute to
the technological and economic standing of Europe. First, the alliance would offer
new, more advanced services at a quicker and inexpensive rate than the parents
would have been capable of providing on their own. To punctuate this point the
Commission noted that the complexity of getting started is shown by the fact that
Newco would not be operational for five years. Moreover, the technology possessed
by MCI was said to be the "most credible and user friendly in the world. 329 Second,
the alliance would restructure the traditional framework used by the national
telephone operators by creating a seamless network of services. The traditional
national networks could not typically interconnect because their structure, software,
and hardware management systems were incompatible. Third, the Commission
remarked that this alliance would strengthen330 Europe's competitive edge.331
Fourth, the Commission reemphasized the cost savings brought on by international
transmission capacity competition and the single network architecture that would
result in economies of scale at the technological and operational level.
The consumer benefits test was nothing more than a brief reiteration of the
points made in the technology and economic benefits discussion. The benefits
flowed from rapid creation of a new, cheaper set of services that would result in a
more competitive status for European companies.332 The exclusive distribution
arrangements benefitted consumers through the convenience of dealing with a
single person contact in case of service problems. The "loss of rights" agreement
advanced stability between the parents' relationship, which the Commission
thought was "necessary" for Newco's success and a "very important element" in the
customer's decision making process. 333.
327. See id. at point 44.
328. Id.
329. Id. at point 53.
330. Id. The Commission remarked earlier in the decision that the U.S. contains 40% of the worlds
multinational corporations (MNCs). Id at point 51.
331. See BT-MCI, supra note 195, at point 51.
332. See id. at point 55.
333. Id. The Commission stated that substantial third-party competition existed from a number of alliances
and MNCs. Id. The competitors listed were AT&T Worldsource, Eunectom, IPSP, IBM, DEC, EDS and various
alliances being developed at the time of the decision. Id. The Commission also noted that MNCs are sophisticated
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The indispensability analysis was more in depth than the previous Article 85(3)
hurdles. The creation of Newco was indispensable because the relevant services
would be brought to the market in a substantially shortened time period. The
reduced time needed to enter the market was a "competitive factor of the utmost
importance.' '334 The parent companies' costs and risks were reduced, and Newco
was seen as the most efficient way to bring about a seamless service network. These
justifications are merely a rehash of points made in each of the prior analyses and
any discussion of lesser restrictive alternatives is absent.
The parties argued that the exclusive distribution agreement protects the
intellectual property rights (IPRs) they contributed to Newco and that there is not
a more efficient way to set up the distribution system. The Commission balanced
these points with the intense competition Newco would face and the substantial
bargaining power of customers. Emphasizing the efficient manner of distribution,
the Commission concluded that the agreement was indispensable.335 The parents did
not preclude passive sales in the agreements, but instead, they saw it as a real
possibility. The Commission required the loss of rights agreement to be modified
before it was considered indispensable. Whereas the original agreement stated that
if MCI chose to compete with BT in Europe, then BT would cease to be bound by
a number of obligations regarding share transfers, voting, and the limit on stock
ownership in MCI.336 The Commission thought this was an unjustified restriction
on trade, but finally accepted it when the parties limited the agreement to a five-
year term. Five years were acceptable because the parent companies were
committed to Newco for that period and Newco would not be fully operational
during that time.337 The joint venture and exclusive distribution agreement were
exempted for seven years from the date of notification, and the loss of rights
agreement was exempted for five years from the date of the decision.338
b. Atlas and Phoenix/GlobalOne
These two alliances are discussed concurrently because they were decided two
months apart and involve a couple of the same parties and many of the same issues.
The discussion that follows discusses the factors of Article 85(1) and 85(3) in the
same order as the other cases in this Comment. Atlas was a joint venture company
between France Telecom (FT) and Deutsche Telekom AG (DT), the incumbent
enough to build their own networks or attract offers from competitors of Newco.
334. See BT-MCI, supra note 195, at point 58.
335. See id. at point 59.
336. See id. at point 32.
337. See id. at point 63.
338. See id. at point 65.
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public telecommunications corporations in France and Germany, respectively.339 It
was aimed at furnishing telecommunications services at large users in Europe. The
Atlas decision contained a very thorough description of the alliance's agreements
and the conditions under which an exemption would be given. Phoenix was a joint
venture between Atlas and Sprint Corporation (Sprint), an American holding
company comprised of companies that provided global voice, data and video-
conferencing services and related products.34 Phoenix was to supply various
worldwide telecommunications services. The Phoenix/GlobalOne case often
deferred to the reasoning and facts contained in the Atlas case.
The Commission categorized the Atlas agreements into five categories: the
Atlas joint venture, the Intellectual and Industrial Property Transfer and Licence
Agreements, the Framework Services Agreement, the Distribution Agreements, and
the Agency Agreements. The Commission did not approve the Agreements as
notified, and the Agency Agreement was eventually stricken by the parents.
The product market definition in both the Atlas and Phoenix/GlobalOne
decision was broader than one would expect from a non high-technology decision.
The Commission identified two product markets in the Atlas case: customized
packages of corporate telecommunication services and packet-switched data
communications services. 341 The Commission's description of the corporate
telecommunications services market in Atlas included a number of very distinct
services." The Commission left the question open as to whether these various
services were themselves distinct product markets because in its view the analysis
would be the same. This justification is a bit insincere considering that the
Commission distinguished the corporate data communications services market.343
The Commission detailed how the data communications services market could be
divided into different customer segments. However, they failed to find that the
different customer needs would necessitate parsing out separate markets. Recall the
Olivetti/Canon joint venture analysis that defined two product markets based not
on inherent difference between the products, but merely on the difference in product
price and target consumers. This product market hair-splitting is expressly rejected
in Atlas and Phoenix/GlobalOne.
The markets in Phoenix/GlobalOne were identified as: (1) global and regional
non-reserved corporate telecommunications services, (2) traveler services, and (3)
339. See Atlas, supra note 281, at point 3. DT's worldwide turnover in 1994 was ECU 31.8 billion, and Fr's
turnover was ECU 21.7 billion. Id.
340. See Phoenix/GlobatOne, supra note 195, at points 3-4. See generally Boam, supra note 279, at 81-91
(providing a comprehensive look at the history of the Phoenix and Atlas deals and legal troubles).
341. See Atlas, supra note 281, at points 5-11.
342. Id. at point 5 (listing the services as: data services, value-added application services, voice VPN
services, value-added leased lines offerings, very small aperture satellite (VSAT) network services, and
outsourcing services).
343. See id. at point 8.
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carrier services.' The Commission made a similar analysis in the
Phoenix/GlobalOne decision. The Commission then listed a diverse array of
services that were to be included within the corporate telecommunications market:
corporate voice services, data communications services, dedicated transmission for
voice and data services, custom network solutions, and platform-based enhanced
services.Ys The Commission did not narrowly define the market for each of the
services despite the fact that the Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition
Rules in the Telecommunications Sector indicated that there was a difference4
6
The Commission defined the traveler services market as "telecommunications
services [that] comprise offerings that meet the demand of individuals who are
away from their normal location, either at home or at work." 7 What may seem like
a narrowly defined market may in fact be quite large and capable of further
narrowing. The court specifically noted the relevant services as: (1) calling card
services, (2) specialized voice services such as equal access and code-based
authorization services, and (3) selected data and enhanced platform services.48
These services are quite distinct from each other, and like the Atlas decision, the
Commission defined the market broadly because the outcome would be the same
irrespective of how broad or narrow the market. A cautious approach is consistent
with the Commission's desire to avoid broad, inflexible rules that might interfere
with maturing high-technology markets.49
The Commission defined the market for carrier services as "compris[ing] the
lease of transmission capacity and the provision of related services to third-party
telecommunications traffic carriers and service providers."3 50 Approvingly alluding
to the competition being forced upon the traditional telecommunications business
model, the Commission listed the relevant services within this model as including:
(1) switched transit,351 (2) dedicated transit,352 (3) traffic hubbing offerings, 353 and
(4) reseller services for service providers without international telecommunications
344. See Phoenix/Global, supra note 195, at point 5.
345. Id.
346. 1991 OJ. (C 233) at point 27 [hereinafterT$lecommunications Sector Guidelines] (recognizing distinct
service markets for terrestrial network provision, voice communication, data communication, and satellites).
347. Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 8.
348. Id. at point 8.
349. See Telecommunications Sector Guidelines, supra note 346, at point 26 ("The Commission can
precisely define these markets only within the framework of individual cases.").
350. Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 10.
351. See id. (defining this as "transport of traffic over bilateral facilities between the originating carrier,
neither the originating carrier nor the terminating carrier need bilateral facilities between themselves, but only with
the transit carrier").
352. See id. (defining this as "leased line offerings for the transport of traffic through the domestic network
of the transit carrier, leased line facilities used for this purpose may include discrete voice circuit or a high-
bandwidth digital circuit that can be used.for both voice and data services").
353. See id. (defining this as "where theprovider takes care of all orpart ofinternational connections; these
offerings are typically designed for emerging carriers, who are interconnected with the provider over bilateral
facilities and whose international traffic is merged with other traffic on the provider's global network").
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facilities of their own.3 4 The court identified the two consumers of carrier services
as established and emerging carriers. It apparently did not need to define the market
more narrowly than consumer purchaser types because the Commission noted that
both purchasers in this case were "sophisticated. 355
The Atlas decision analyzed the geographic market with respect to the two
product markets. The Commission referred to the detailed discussion in the
BT-MCI decision regarding the distinction between global, cross-border regional,
and national level geographic markets. The cost structure of supplying customized
corporate packages of telecommunications services was dependant on the
geographic coverage of the service. The price difference was substantial, therefore,
the markets were distinct.356 However, the cost difference between different
geographic markets was not as great as that for packet-switched data
communications services. The demand, supply, and traffic volumes for this service
were only on a national scale.357
Phoenix provided corporate telecommunication services on a global scale in
order to interconnect providers of telecommunications services via its network.
Those corporations that connect to this network are located throughout the world.358
Data communications services were deemed to be offered only in the Europe-wide
geographic market. The investment in Sprint by DT and FT was considered to reach
a global geographic market because it was an effort to extend its services into
global markets.
359
With regards to the market for traveler services, the Commission did not define
the market. It stated that the market is increasingly global and is a function of
consumer demand for integrated services. They continued that the question of the
geographic scope can be left unanswered in this case because "the finding of narrow
geographic markets would not affect the assessment of the party's competitive
,,361position. The geographic market for carrier services was determined to be
international "by nature" because it is a substitute for the carrier's own international
lines and the transit services offer "cable-or satellite-based routing capacity across
third countries. ' 362
354. Id.
355. Id. at point 1I.
356. See Atlas, supra note 281, at points 12-13.
357. This was the conclusion despite the fact a Fr German subsidiary provided one fifth of its
communications services across the border. See id at point 14. The Commission noted that the global and Europe-
wide geographic market may be converging so as to possibly render future distinctions meaningless. Id. at point
15.
358. See Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 13.
359. See id. at point 17.
360. Id. at point 15.
361. Id.
362. Id. at point 16.
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With regards to potential or actual competitors, the Commission briefly listed
a number of main competitors of Phoenix in the non-reserved corporate
telecommunications services market. 63 It found fewer competitors in the traveler36
and carrier 65 services markets.
i. Article 85(1) Analysis
The Phoenix and Atlas joint ventures were not granted negative clearance
simply because the joint ventures would restrict competition and affect trade
between member states. The parents involved in these decisions were direct
competitors for some of the services transferred to the joint ventures, and their size
suggested that they could enter the markets alone. According to the agreements, the
parents would keep abreast of any technological developments in the markets they
abandoned to the joint ventures. This made it possible for them to re-enter the
markets at a later time.
The Commission concluded in Phoenix/GlobalOne that Article 85(1) did not
apply to DT and Fr's investment agreements with Sprint. The Commission noted
that the policy of the ECJ and the Commission is that Article 85(1) does not apply
to investment agreements unless "the agreements affect the competitive behavior
of the parties to the transaction. ' '366 There was no threat of DT and FT's
representation on Sprint's board leading to all three entities coordinating their
competitive behavior via the confidential information to which the parents would
be privy because: (1) DT and Fr were prohibited by U.S. law from accessing and
misusing Sprint's confidential information, (2) the investment agreement does not
provide DT and Fr the possibility of "exercising a controlling influence over
Sprint," and (3) private agreements between the party's enumerated provisions that
prohibited misuse of confidential information.367 They concluded that the
investment agreement was not within Article 85(1).
In both cases the Commission viewed several provisions as a restriction on
competition: (1) an anti-competition obligation binding on the parents with regards
363. These competitors include: AT&T/World Partners; Cable and Wireless Pic; Concert; IBM; Kokusai
Denshin Denwa Company Ltd; Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation; Unisource; and the regional Bell
operating companies in the United States. Id. at point 24.
364. Id. at point 25 (stating that AT&T had issues 21% of the calling cards in Europe resulting in 59% of
the Europe to U.S. traffic. MCI issued 10.5% of the calling cards in Europe, which resulted in 27% of the Europe
to U.S. traffic. Executive Telecard International had similar numbers to that of MCI).
365. Id. at point 26 (listing AT&T and BT, both with about a fifth of the market, Cable & Wireless, MCI,
and Teleglobe Canada as main competitors).
366. Id. at point 51. The agreements between the parties consist of DT and Fr each purchasing a 10% equity
stake in Sprint, with an accompanying proportional board representation and other agreements. The second main
agreement involved the creation of a joint venture called Phoenix which was to provide non-reserved global
telecommunications services, amongst other types of similar services, to corporate, carrier, and individual
consumers.
367. Id.
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to the joint ventures' activities, (2) the obligation that the parents obtain all global-
service needs from the joint ventures, and (3) the designation of DT and FT as
exclusive distributors in their respective countries.368 The first two restrictions were
considered ancillary to the creation of the joint ventures, therefore no independent
Article 85 analysis was required. The Commission found important that the
substantial risk, cost, and robust competition necessitated these particular
agreements if the parties were to successfully enter and compete in the global
telecommunications market.369 The exclusive distribution agreement was not
considered ancillary to the creation of the joint venture because the restriction on
competition was appreciable and other non-exclusive forms of distribution were
possible.370
ii. Article 85(3) Analysis
The overall Article 85(3) analyses was thorough in both cases and it included
many of the same concerns earlier in the joint venture cases. The Commission first
outlined the merits of all the agreements with respect to the four elements of Article
85(3), and thereafter discussed these merits within the context of the product
markets described earlier.37'
The Phoenix/GlobalOne decision merged the technical and economic progress
tests under one heading. The merger highlights the fact that the separate analyses
typical in most other high-technology cases are merely a distinction without a
difference. As was pointed out in earlier high-technology joint venture and alliance
cases, the same arguments are commonly used to justify progress in both areas. The
Phoenix/GlobalOne decision reiterated the common theme that the joint venture
would be adding value to leased lined capacity by applying their own homogenous
network elements. This would make available new services, albeit through already
existing technology, that would result in a seftnless global telecommunications
service at a lower cost than if the parents had provided it on their own.372 This case
illustrates the notion that the mere bringing together of already existing technology
under one roof is considered either technological or economic progress. Combining
pre-existing technology is arguably technological and economic progress, but it is
also a convenience-to-the-consumer argument. It shows that the Commission is
receptive to the notion that increased consumer convenience is a benefit. They
imply this by mentioning the new "seamless," or "single network architecture,"
368. See id. at point 52; Atlas, supra note 281, at point 41.
369. See Atlas, supra note 281, at point 44.
370. See id. at point 54 (noting that the agreement is not appreciable because "Germany and France together
account for 40% of all telecommunications revenues in the European Union").
371. See id. at points 67-72.
372. See Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 57. The network elements the court focused on were
switches, software platforms, and signaling systems.
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being created, however, they do not mention the new technology that will result
from it. The only connection the Commission made to economic progress was that
the cost savings through economies of scale would probably result in lower prices.
A firmer connection could have been made between increased consumer choice and
the resulting downward pressure on prices. Another economic-progress factor
mentioned was that time was saved by allowing this alliance because Sprint lacked
the resources to build the same network this alliance creates in as short of time.373
TheAtlas decision separated the economic and technological progress analyses,
however, it chose to focus on European competitiveness in the economic progress
section. What may have been self-evident to the Commission was not explained in
its analysis. The technological test incorporated the competitiveness argument as
well.374 Software and hardware incompatibilities within member states' national
networks would probably not make possible seamless inter-connectivity through
added value services. In what may be analogous to the cart pulling the horse, DT
and Fr's commitment to invest and maintain a large presence in the European-wide
market was called a "requirement" for offering the intended services. The
Phoenix/GlobalOne case briefly mentioned that the exclusive dealership agreement
was important because it made certain that DT and FT would concentrate on
making Phoenix successful rather than searching for alternatives to the joint
venture. The Commission stated, "[o]nly if DT and FT are seen as fully committed
to Phoenix will the joint venture benefit from the reputation and presence of its
parents in the marketplace. ' 37
The notion that a seamless network benefits consumers was recycled in the
benefit-to-the-consumer test. The new services and their expansive geographic
reach were the core concerns of the Commission because these aspects of the deal
provided quicker services than could otherwise be provided by parties going it
alone.376 In a not-so-subtle nod to the importance of European global
competitiveness, the Commission stated in Phoenix/GlobalOne: "The creation of
a global venture committed to undertaking the investment needed to be present
worldwide is therefore crucial for the choice and quality of communications
available to MNC's and eventually SME's.,'377 The mere "going global" may be a
benefit in and of itself regardless of the particular product. The Atlas decision
affirmed this point by stating, "Only global alliances can offer global connectivity
of services. 378
373. See Boam, supra note 279.
374. See Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at points 48-49 ("[Ilnterconnection] is indispensable for the
viability of competitive voice service offerings.").
375. Id. at point 59; see also Daniel R. Mummery & Robert M. Finkel, The Emergence of Technology
Strategic Alliances, MERGER & AcQUIStTtON LAW., April 1998.
376. See id. at point 60.
377. Id.
378. See Atlas, supra note 281, at point 54.
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Deciding whether or not the agreements were indispensable was a mere
formality due to the repeated pronouncements throughout the decisions that the
Phoenix and Atlas joint ventures were necessary to reduce cost and risk and service
global and regional markets. Similar to the other high-technology cases mentioned
in this Comment, the Commission implied that the joint venture was not necessary
for a global presence, but instead it was necessary for a global presence in a shorter
time period than if the parents had gone it alone.379 The Commission concedes that
the parties were able to provide these services eventually after amassing a
substantial amount of capital themselves.380 In a display of how watered down the
indispensability element may become, they stated that Phoenix is a "decisive means
to overcome the technical and logistic difficulties of providing the
services.., which cannot be addressed satisfactorily under the existing" system.381
The exclusivity of the distribution agreement in Phoenix/GlobalOne, which
guaranteed protection for DT's and FT's IPRs, contributed to thejoint venture. This
creates an incentive for parents to contribute more valuable IPRs than normal.382 It
would restrict competition normally, however for three factors ensured that no
elimination of competition would occur: (1) there existed competitive alternatives
in the market, (2) customers had substantial bargaining power in the market for
customized packages of corporate telecommunications services to corporate users,
and (3) the opening for DT and FT's passive sales into each other's home market.383
The talk of eliminating competition and the total lack of discussion regarding lesser
restrictive alternatives to the exclusive distribution agreements leads one to
question whether this was an indispensability analysis, much less a sophisticated
one. The Atlas justification is applicable to PhoenixfGlobalOne as well, and in that
case the Commission stated that any other distribution agreement would be less
protective of the parents' IPRs, thus reducing the incentive to collaborate.38
The elimination of competition test, the last hurdle of Article 85(3), repeated
exactly the above three reasons in concluding that the Phoenix joint venture did not
violate this test.385 The Commission required the modification of exclusive
distribution agreements so that DT, Fr, and any of their subsidiaries cannot sell
Atlas' services under the same contract covering their reserved services-typically
referred to as "bundling. ' 3
86
379. See id. at point 61.
380. See id.
381. PhoenixlGlobalone, supra note 195, at point 61 (emphasis added).
382. See id. at point 62.
383. Id. at point 65.
384. See Atlas, supra note 281, at point 58.
385. The Atlas decision provided a somewhat clear definition of these points. Id.
386. See id. at point 60; Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 66. Atlas articulates that the
conditions are necessary because: there is an asymmetry between the parents monopoly networks and the "small
presence and reliance on interconnection of new market entrants on the other; there is insufficient regulatory
transparency. These conditions would impair market entry by competitors. See Atlas, supra note 281, at point 61.
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The initial notifications of both alliances encountered major Commission
concern regarding the elimination of competition. The Commission imposed a
number of conditions to which the parents agreed. First, the Commission required
that the parents award two alternative infrastructure licenses so as to create
competition and consumer choice. Second, Atlas and its competitors must be able
to interconnect to DT'S and FT's networks on non-discriminatory terms. 387 Third,
Atlas is not to have a competitive advantage over competitors as the result of the
parents sharing confidential information. Fourth, FT must sell its Germany
subsidiary Info AG. Finally, the Commission identified two customer segments:
customers that demand casual, low-speed, low-volume applications and customers
that generate more traffic on a regular basis.388 The profit margin on providing
services to the low volume users was low, hence a disincentive for investors to
invest.38
9
The Phoenix/GlobalOne decision dismissed the notion that competition was
eliminated in the global market for corporate telecommunication services because
entry into this "immature market" required an "established United States
provider. ' 3
90
c. Unisource
There were no surprises in the latest high-technology decision involving
Unisource. It started in 1992 as a 50/50 joint venture between ITT Telecom BV
(PIT Telecom) and Swedish Telecom International. One year later, Schweizerische
PIT-Betriebe (Swiss PIT) joined Unisource. 39' After a lengthy examination of the
structure of Unisource, the Commission listed as the relevant product markets those
which were found in BT-MCI and Phoenix/GlobalOne, namely non-reserved
387. See Atlas, supra note 281, at point 64.
388. Id. at point 69.
389. Atlas was seen as creating competition on the national level because there existed mainly the
incumbent national monopoly. Id. at point 72.
390. See Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 67. ("The elimination of Sprint as an independent
supplier does not lead to an elimination of competition in light of significant third-party competition stemming
from existing alliances, such as AT&T World Partners, Concert and IPSP, and from future alliances between TOs
that are not yet positioned, such as the RBOCs, NT and European TOs such as Mercury.').
391. FIT Telecom is the Dutch incumbent telecommunications operator. It is wholly owned by the public
company Royal FPT Netherlands NV (KPN), which is in turn 44 percent owned by the Dutch State. Swiss PIT
is run by the Swiss State, and Telia AB is owned by the Swedish State. See Unisource, supra note 195, at points
1-6.
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corporate telecommunications services, 39  traveler services, 393  and carrier
394services.
The geographic market was considered primarily cross-border regional, with
the exception of non-reserved corporate telecommunications. Varying consumer
needs meant that this latter product market had a global, regional, and national
geographic scope.95 The market for traveler services "appears to be increasingly
global," yet the Commission left this question open because "the finding of narrow
geographic markets. would not affect the assessment of the party's competitive
position."396 Sounding uncertain, the Commission stated that the market for carrier
services is "at least cross-border regional., 397 This has been stated in every
telecommunications alliance case the Commission has decided.
i. Article 85(1) Analysis
The conclusion that Unisource was a cooperative joint venture stems from the
improbability that any one party could exercise decisive influence on either of the
two governing- boards-the Managing Board and the Supervisory Board.398 The
Commission concluded after a brief analysis that the joint venture and various
agreements restricted trade.3 9  This even after the Commission stated the
shareholders of Unisource were actual competitors in several of the markets.
With regards to the contractual provisions, the "one telecom country" and non-
competition provisions were considered ancillary and subject to Article 85(1)
analysis together with the joint venture. It was recognized that the "one telecom
country" structure could step-up the level of the parent company's coordination of
competitive behavior. This was not seen as a problem. Furthermore, the structure
agreement was inseparable from thejoint venture because decisions adopted by the
392. The services included within this market were: (1) corporate voice services, (2) data communications
services using in particular the X.25, Frame Relay, and Internet protocols (IP), (3) dedicated transmission for voice
and data services, (4) custom network solutions, and (5) platform-based enhanced services. Id. at point 25.
393. The Commission noted that the "most relevant" of these services were calling card services and GSM
mobile services. The Commission noted that GSM services were geared towards travelers, but also used by
customers with fixed networks. This latter use may eventually be included under the corporate telecommunications
market instead of the traveler services market. Id. at points 26-27.
394. This market includes lease of transmission capacity and related services to other carriers and service
providers. These services included: switched transit, dedicated transit, traffic hubbing offerings, and reseller
services. Id. at point 28.
395. See id. at point 30.
396. See id. at point 31.
397. See id. at point 32.
398. See id. at point 76. Point 8 of the decision outlines the duties of each Board. The Management Board
is a three-person arrangement elected by unanimous shareholder approval. The Board supervises the day-to-day
operations of Unisource. The Supervisory Board monitors the Management Board's conduct of affairs and the
general course of business. id. at point 8.
399. See id. at points 75-80. The agreements were an exclusive distribution agreement and two contractual
agreements.
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parents regarding their networks would have a major impact on the services
transferred to Unisource. Therefore, it would not make sense to hinder the seamless
nature of the telecommunications operations.4° The exclusive distribution
agreements were not ancillary and were caught by Article 85(1) because "they have
the object or effect of isolating each national market involved from imports of those
services from other EU Member States."'40 Because of the pan-European nature of
the agreement, these agreements affected trade between member states.
ii. Article 85(3) Analysis
The technological and economic progress hurdle was satisfied by a mere list of
all the typical benefits that have appeared in most of the Commission's high-
technology decisions. Unisource expected the arrival of converging technology and
somewhat seamless telecommunications services, all at a substantial savings of
cost.' The joint venture was going to facilitate the building of a trans-European
network which would provide better services to consumers. The Commission also
included an argument not seen in other strategic alliance cases-notably this high-
technology alliance is the most recent analyzed case. The joint venture would
enhance the competitive edge of Unisource's competitors through improved
services because they would be able to either: (1) interconnect with Unisource's
public packet-switched data networks, (2) access public packet-switched data
networks from other networks, or (3) interconnect with the parent company's other
networks.'03
Quicker presence of the product in the market, lower prices, increased choice,
and enhanced European competitiveness were all going to be realized consumer
benefits. The Commission listed as the exclusive distribution agreement's sole
benefit a "single person to contact in respect of any contract. ''4 04 Addressing the
indispensability factor of Article 85(3), the Commission cited integrated
management schemes as necessary to establishing credibility with customers. 405 The
Commission essentially encouraged alliance formation when discussing medium-
sized business' desire to enter into alliances in order to compete with larger
companies. The Commission said, "it is only by joining forces that the parties will
be able to field an array of pan-European services on a reduced cost and time basis
as Unisource is doing."' 06 The exemption was granted for five years on the
400. Id. at point 82.
401. Id. at point 83.
402. See id. at points 85-9.
403. See id. at point 88.
404. Id. at point 91 ("This will substantially benefit customers... who up to now had to deal with several
counterparts in the different countries or regions.") (emphasis added).
405. See id. at point 92.
406. Id.
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condition that the parents grant two licenses in each product market for alternative
infrastructures. 40 The Commission also compelled Unisource and the parents to
submit to a number of periodic accounting and records inspections.408
C. Summary
A starting point in discerning a difference in analyses of joint ventures and
alliances would be to glean a definition of an alliance out of the language of these
decisions-to see if they are merely borrowing the "strategic alliance" term, or
imposing it themselves. This is difficult to accomplish because although the
Commission uses the alliance terminology, it does not expressly distinguish joint
ventures from them. For example, in Olivetti/Digital the Commission borrowed the
term from the title of the parties' agreement.
The common thread throughout the alliance cases was the creation of a
cooperative joint venture. The Commission's concern for control of the joint
venture may be increasing. Of course, the alliance cases involve huge corporations
and in several cases a nation's telecommunications monopoly was involved. The
allowance of telecommunication giants to cooperate extensively in horizontal
arrangements is nearly proof positive that a less stringent analysis is being applied.
The high-technology cases appear to have explicit agreements with regards to the
distribution of power. This was the circumstance in some older cases, but even then,
there appeared to be few cases where control was not an issue. The strategic
alliance analysis is procedurally the same as the traditional model, with only a slight
variation. The only difference being that the Commission occasionally collapsed the
different Article 85(3) factors into fewer categories for discussion. This is not
surprising because in every alliance case the Commission concluded the four factors
were satisfied using many of the same facts: reduced prices, reduced time products
brought to market, enhanced European competitiveness, and new technology. The
Commission is positively receptive to the notion that a rearrangement of existing
technology adequately satisfies the technological progress test. In older cases, this
alone would not have saved the joint venture. The Commission oddly uses a fairly
speculative and somewhat abstract notion as supporting the economic benefits
element.
407. See id. at point 103. The Commission listed a comprehensive set of additional conditions to exempt.
Id. at points 44-64.
408. See id. at point 105.
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V. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ANALYSIS
Although there exists a non-telecommunications alliance decision, the
following comparison between joint venture and alliance cases of the same or
similar products focuses more so on telecommunications than other areas. This
comment finishes with a quick word on recent developments and the future
direction of competition policy.
The treatment afforded to alliances is virtually the same as that given to joint
ventures.4 9 However, this is not saying much considering there have been few high-
technology alliance decisions. The alliances involved numerous agreements and in
most instances the creation of a joint venture. However, the telecommunications
cases show subtle differences that may be the beginning of a distinct analysis. No
credible comparison between the Olivetti-Digital alliance and the joint-venture
cases (involving non-service product markets) discussed in Part I can be made
only based on one case. However, the case warrants a few remarks.
The Olivetti-Digital alliance involved computer hardware, and it was similar
to the non-telecommunications service, joint-venture cases in procedural and
substantive review. However, in Olivetti-Digital the Commission may have defined
the market a bit broader than they have done in the joint venture cases. Instead of
a market for each individual RISC-based component, the Commission appeared to
group all the components into one market. Olivetti's computer system end-products
that incorporated Digital's RISC technology were also aggregated into one product
market. This was so despite the fact that the RISC technology would be
incorporated into a "full range of computer systems, from palmtops to
mainframes." 4'0 Palmtops and mainframes are clearly not interchangeable or
targeted at the same consumer segment. Contrast this to the Olivetti/Canon joint
venture in which the product market for different printers were distinguished almost
entirely upon price difference and the consumer segment targeted.41' In the Pasteur
Merieux-Merckjoint venture decision, multivalent vaccines were defined into very
narrow product markets determined by the precise combination of different
vaccines. It is clear that individual vaccines are not interchangeable, but there is a
somewhat stronger argument that multivalent vaccines comprised of many
individual vaccines are interchangeable with another if the difference is only slight.
The Commission, however, seemed to levy aper se rule regarding the two types of
409. SeeJohn TempleLang, European CommunityAntitrust Law: Innovation Markets and High Technology
Industries, 20 FORDHAMIr'LL.J. 717,731 (1997) ("If it were thought desirable that Community antitrust law
should adopt substantially altered approaches for these industries, they are not yet visible."). It should be noted
that there is presently a dearth of alliance decisions involving software, pharmaceutical, biotech, or any other high-
technology manufacturer producing non-service products, for exanple, computer chips.
410. See Olivetti-Digital, supra note 195, at point 6.
411. Cf. Optical Fibres, supra note 51, at point 59 (distinguishing optical fibers lines and the traditional
cables). But see Vacuum Interrupters, supra note 240, Part I.B. Market for all interrupters, not just the more
expensive one.
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vaccines. The Olivetti-Digital decision explained neither how palmtops and similar
products are interchangeable with mainframe computers, nor how the consumer
segments compared. Whether or not this was result oriented reasoning, it still leaves
little guidance for practitioners to follow.
With regards to telecommunications services cases, the Commission tended to
define the alliance and joint-venture markets more broadly than the non-
telecommunication services cases. Even though the specific sub-services outlined
by the Commission-those that fell under the broader market definition actually
used in the analyses-were probable distinct markets, the Commission found no
need to narrowly define them for the purposes of the analysis. 2 Most of these
services cannot reasonably be considered as interchangeable at this time-even
though several different products can be used for the same purposes under certain
circumstances, for example, fax machines and telephones. In most instances, the
different services were aimed at different consumer types.41 3
Narrowly defined markets may give businesses in that market a giant defacto
market share, well over the five percent or ten percent threshold that triggers
notification. Where technology markets are constantly being created, the first party
involved commands 100% of the market share. This is where the commission may
play with the definition of a particular product market so as to broaden favored or
important markets enough to dilute the market share. However, recall the
Commission's analysis in Iridium and IPSP.414 The Commission weighed the cost
and risk involved in entering a new satellite telecommunications market in which
the parties would command 100% of the market share and found that the
agreements were not caught within Article 85(1). The Commission reasoned that
as the creators of this new market, the parties were creating competition where none
preexisted. This may either signal the declining concern of market share in high
technology generally, or perhaps merely its lack of importance in newly created
markets.
It appears that the distinction between a concentrative or cooperative joint
venture will become increasingly important in high technology. Alliances often
times involve multiple parties with varying degrees of ownership and control.
415
Properly distinguishing between the two types of joint ventures involves
determining whether or not the parents can re-enter the markets they abandoned
themselves and transferred to the joint venture. However, the speed of market
412. See, e.g., Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at point 15; Atlas, supra note 281, at point 6.
413. See, e.g., Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, at points 5-10; Atlas, supra note 281, at points 5-11.
414. See discussion supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
415. See Ungerer, supra note 23, at 1175 ("[D]ue to the high dynamics of markets... the distinction
between cooperation and concentration [is] a moving target.").
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change, the global nature of alliances, the expanding web of business relationships
all muddle attempts at properly defining the type of joint venture." 6
The Commission is sensitive to costs imposed by the legal environment because
it is a factor determining competitiveness, especially when a business is medium-
sized.4 17 Presumably medium-sized businesses do not have the same cash reserves
as bigger businesses to handle legal costs. The present administrative and legal
systems do not furnish Commission decisions in a reasonable time. The White
Paper on Modernisation puts forward potential solutions to these problems.41 8 The
present framework is considered inappropriate for present day realities because the
EU has grown from six to fifteen members, which now includes over 350 million
people speaking eleven languages.419 The White Paper on Modernisation argues that
in order for the Commission to accomplish its mission of enforcing Article 85
within the guidelines of Article 87(2), the procedural framework must change.42°
The Commission seeks to accomplish three goals. First, to refocus on the most
serious cases involving restriction of competition. Their target would be "cartels,
particularly in concentrated markets and in markets which are being liberalised. 42'
The clear implication of this goal is an increased attention on the information
technology sectors. Second, it seeks to decentralize the enforcement of competition
laws. The present system is perceived as increasingly ineffective as EU membership
grows. 41 The proposed system looks more like the U.S. federal court system in that
the Circuit Court of Appeals is analogous to the member states' national courts,
with the Commission having the final word on the issues if it so chooses. This
brings up the possibility that the national courts of the member states may decide
the same issues differently, thus necessitating the Commission's role to resolve
jurisdictional splits to effectuate uniform competition policy. Third, the
Commission proposes to ease the procedural constraints on undertakings. 423 This
appears to be the most dramatic change from the present framework because it
appears to be taking a step back from the Regulation 17 notification procedures.
The Commission states, "[a] system of prohibition of restrictive practices does not
416. See id. at 1169 (citing BT-MCI as an example of confusion, the case was first notified as a
concentration, but later determined to be a coopertive joint venture). This may be increasingly hard to determine
in high-technology industries due to an "environment of rapid regulatory evolution, changing alliances, and the
convergence of markets." Id. at 1170.
417. Commission White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, Commission Programme No. 99/027, at point 50 [hereinafter White Paper on Modemisation], available
at <http://europa.eu.int/comn/dg04/entente/>.
418. See id. at point 55.
419. Id. at point 5 (noting that membership is likely to grow).
420. Id. at point 42.
421. Id. at point 45. Illustrating their inefficient use of resources, the White Paper notes that Commission
decisions only account for six percent of cases closed. Id. at point 44.
422. See id. at points 46, 82-107.
423. See id. at points 48, 76-81.
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need to have an authorisation system in order to work properly."424 They conclude
that a system does not need to validate all restrictive practices as the current system
employs. The Commission continued, "the current division between paragraph 1
and paragraph 3 in implementing Article is artificial and runs counter to the integral
nature of Article 85, which requires economic analysis of the overall impact of
restrictive practices."425
In both joint-venture and alliance cases, it appears that the Commission is less
concerned about close cooperation than about public access to essential facilities.426
The Commission is worried that with converging markets, companies may take
control of crucial segments that others require in order to benefit from the full value
chain. 427 This may mean that any one segment of a network that could bottle-neck
a system and which may take competitors more than a reasonable time to replicate
will be deemed an essential facility.4 28 Because seamless interconnection between
an increasing number of information-technology networks is Europe's goal, new
"facilities" and products that become integrated into a network may potentially be
another essential facility.
Other areas the Commission is particularly concerned about include: (1)
interconnection agreements, (2) schemes established for financing universal service,
(3) access to rights of way, (4) cross-ownership of different networks and joint
provision of network and services, and (5) the emergence of global and regional
partnerships and alliances.429
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission clearly distinguishes between an alliance and ajoint venture.
In recent Competition Policy Reports, the Commission distinguished the two
without directly defining an alliance. It can be gleaned from the context of its case
decisions and discussions in Competition Policy Reports that the Commission
424. Id. at point 48.
425. Id. at point 49 (citation omitted). It is suggested that inserting a "rule of reason" test in Article 85(1)
is more appropriate than in Article 85(3). Id. at point 56. The Commission defined "rule of reason" as an
"approach in which the authorities or courts responsible for competition law balance the pro-competitive aspects
of an agreement against its anti-competitive aspects in deciding whether to prohibit it." Id. at n.46.
426. See European Commission, Status Report on European Union Telecommunications Policy, Part ll.C.
(visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http.//www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/tcstatus.htm>; see also Satellites:
Commission Blocks Nordic Satellite Deal in Rare Decision, Tech Europe, Sept. 7, 1995 (stating that
Commissioner Van Miert is worried about access). See generally C.G. Veljanovski, Competition in Mobile
Phones: The MMC Rejects Oftel's Competitive Analysis, (1999) 4 E.C.L.R. 205 (examining a "bottleneck
monopoly" in the United Kingdom's mobile phone market). See, e.g., Atlas, supra note 281, at points 28-29;
Phoenix/GlobalOne, supra note 195, art. 2(b).
427. See Ungerer, supra note 23, at 1165; see also DE WOOT, supra note 43, at 18 (pointing out that the
value chain emphasizes that each function, or participant, is an "enterprise subsystem").
428. See id. at 1166.
429. See Status Report on European Union Telecommunication Policy, supra note 426, pt. ll.C.
1999/High-Tech Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
views alliances as having more of an international or global element than joint
ventures 30 A global perspective will, in all likelihood, increase the favorability of
the two partnering strategies. However, similar treatment of both joint ventures and
alliances indicates that for analytical purposes, it is a distinction without a
difference. This may be in part because The White Paper on Modernisation, the
Commission's hesitation to define markets and interfere with high technology, and
the absence of a sophisticated analysis all signify the Commission's desire to
expound policy in broad strokes rather than micro-manage high-technology
industries with blunt, inflexible laws.
The Commission must eventually grapple with the issue regarding the market
share's degree of importance at any one time in quickly evolving markets.
However, the almost inherent global nature of alliances puts them in a better
position than joint ventures to create the Information Society.43" '
The liberal application to high-technology sectors will assuredly continue,
although, the spirit of liberalization may potentially create a race-to-the-bottom
scenario. Because innovation is fueled primarily by the income derived from the
commercialization of innovative products,432 it stands to reason that any nation that
fears being left behind competitively will make its antitrust laws a bit more
favorable to businesses than other countries. Businesses willing to relocate and
innovate domestically orperhaps merely partner with local businesses will pressure
competitors to relocate or pressure nations to match the advantage. This gradual
stripping away antitrust constraints will be viewed by some as harmful to consumer
welfare.
Whether or not this occurs, the general liberalization of high-technology laws
is appropriate if the goal is to remain competitive in global commerce. Strict
application will surely stifle innovation or force Community businesses to relocate
elsewhere. Because high-technology will continue to evolve rapidly in the future,
the Commission must evolve along with it even if this means further liberalizing
Article 85 application.
430. See Ungerer, supra note 23, at 1175 ("ITihe telecommunications, media, and information technology
markets are inherently global.").
431. See Boam, supra note 279, at 94.
432. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 20, at 20.
